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ABSTRACT: This paper provides an intersectional portrait of the most powerful and influential 
group in the world: the global power elite, symbolized by the Davos man. An examination of this 
emerging class and its national and denationalized components includes analyses of the global 
economic and political system, concepts of the American power elite, hierarchal institutions of 
power, and the potential for elite gender parity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
After a long, $10,000 flight with Emirates to Zurich in your First Class private suite and 
the complimentary ride to Davos, Switzerland in the back of a Mercedes, you finally get to stretch 
your legs as you walk through the fresh mountain air into your hotel. Substituting your Prada 
dress shoes for snow boots, you trek into more modest accommodations than usual, a suite at the 
Steigenberger Grandhotel Belvédère. The roster of A-list suite neighbors, however, is less than 
modest. Pop stars, royalty, billionaires, religious figures, headlining CEOs, and prime ministers 
are all a mere golf chip away. There are quite a few discussions you would like to have; the best 
ones will likely transpire in one of these rooms. Your gratis ski passes may have to go unused. 
You look at your itinerary. A welcome reception with Professor Klaus Schwab, a debate hosted 
by Time Magazine on the “new economic reality,” another by major broadcaster China Central 
Television, a briefing by famed orchestral conductor Itay Talgam, addresses by the Indonesian 
President SusiloYudhoyono and British Prime Minister David Cameron, a talk by inspirational 
and limbless preacher Nick Vujicic, a “conversation” with Bill Clinton, group discussions with 
Harvard leaders, and more sessions than can you can attend. But you know these are not why you 
come. Other than hopes of running into Angelina Jolie, you come to the World Economic Forum 
meeting for the highbrow hallway interactions, the informal meetings, the private dinner parties 
(especially the one hosted by Pepsico), and the evening events held by Goldman Sachs, Infosys, 
Google, and other competitively swanky companies. It doesn’t matter where you come from 
(geographically speaking), but it matters where you are going. You are a Davos man.  
In an increasingly globalized world where markets defy borders and where goods and 
communication move more than ever, cross-border connections are deepening. Trade 
liberalization and internationalization are growing phenomena, facilitated not only by 
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governments but also through organizations and forces that operate outside the realm of national 
boundaries. Multinational corporations, free-trade zones, international organizations such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, international finance agents, and other global 
actors drive the economic, political, and social conditions of each nation (Beneria 8). 
Political and economic changes are rooted in the social and cultural changes reflected by 
real-life women and men. When one percent of those men and women possess forty percent of the 
global wealth, their patterns and trends are significant subjects of study (“Billion-Dollar Babies”). 
A new brand of elite has developed, emerging as an increasingly denationalized, individualized, 
and competitive group with shifted values and attitudes. This global and influential group, 
symbolized as the Davos man, includes “businessmen, bankers, officials, and intellectuals who 
hold university degrees, work with  words and numbers, speak some English and share beliefs in 
individualism, market economics and  democracy” (Beneria 9). The Davos man’s influence on 
government, economy, and military is immense, to the point where he comprises a global 
“superclass” as author David Rothkopf terms it, a new brand of international ruling class and 
power elite. The movement from the national stage to the international means removal from the 
national electorate system, and thus the escalation of a “bell jar” effect, where leadership figures 
have more in common with their international peers than their fellow citizens of a different class. 
The (oft indirect) decision makers are culturally, socially, and economically removed from the 
majority, but may demonstrate a usually academic interest in topics like poverty and development.  
The superclass convenes at global events such as the Trilateral Commission, the 
Bilderberg meetings, the Bohemian Grove seminars, or the World Economic Forum that meets in 
Davos, Switzerland, this paper’s namesake (“Billion-Dollar Babies”). The reviews of the Davos 
man are mixed, often linked with shifting attitudes towards neoliberalism and globalization. The 
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extent of his influence is indefinite. This paper seeks to delve into the development, 
characteristics, and impact of the Davos man, while considering related international phenomena. 
The conditions of the twenty-first century have given rise to the creation of a transnational elite, 
as represented by the Davos man, whose ideology and identity are becoming superficially 
engendered and challenged and serve as indices for the modern world. 
 This paper will examine the nature of the Davos man, his theoretical and historical 
background, and the makeup of his global presence and its evolution. It will analyze the gender 
aspect of the global “economic man” and how it has changed since the term was used by Adam 
Smith as women become increasingly participatory figures in the capitalist world. As the World 
Economic Forum quota boosts female attendees in Davos, what is the effect, and is there a 
corresponding change in the composition of the global elite? As the number of participating 
women rises at this symbolic meeting, is it simply representing a sexed change rather than a 
gendered change? Is the concept of a “Davos woman” even viable? In analyzing the Davos man 
and the various paths to such a role, this paper will investigate the possibility and prospects 
women have in following them. Such an examination will shine light on the shifting topography 
of the global elite, its projections, challenges, opposition, and implications, the last focus of the 
paper.  
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CHAPTER 1. Defining Davos 
“The proprietor of stock [as opposed to land] is not necessarily 
attached to any particular country” (qtd. in Huntington, “Dead 
Souls” 7.) 
         --Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
 
Decades before political scientist Samuel Huntington coined the term “Davos man” in 
2004, a new breed of elite was developing and operating at higher global and financial levels 
than ever before. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace scholar and regular Davos 
attendee himself, David Rothkopf considers this group significant and cohesive enough to 
comprise its own class, which he names the “superclass”. He goes far enough to name some 
names (which he insists are immaterial as they are soon made obsolete) and compile a list of the 
over six thousand individuals that he deems bear enough global clout and influence to be ranked 
at the top of the international pecking order. Despite the numerous challenges of building such a 
list and its transient nature, its patterns and demographics can be telling enough to outweigh the 
potential imperfections. He has approximately identified a group from around the world of the 
highest ranking figures in the biggest companies, banks, and investment firms, and the most 
influential leaders in politics, governments, military organizations, media, religions, NGOs, and 
illicit organizations (Rothkopf 289). With each member advancing his or her own interests and 
bearing influence over millions of lives all over the world, they belong to a powerful class 
(Rothkopf 289). Thus the organizations and meetings that join them together and provide a sort 
of “social glue” become topics of hot debate and suspicion.  
Bilderberg, Carlos Slim’s Fathers and Sons retreats, the Joint Annual Meeting of the IMF 
and the World Bank, and the aforementioned examples of other meeting places also serve as 
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venues for networking, cutting across bureaucracy, schmoozing, and sharing views among the 
superclass. However, the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos is easily the most 
prominent and established organization for such assembly, and hence the most representative. 
Forum founder Klaus Schwab himself determines the select invitees, who number around 2,500. 
He asserts that while it is an increasingly volatile and rapidly changing position, a Davos elite 
always fulfills the two criteria that he or she must “have influence on others” and “command a 
powerful institution or organization” (Rothkopf 271). In the absence of a world government, 
Davos is oft seen as a symbol of the world’s elite convening to fill that void and direct the global 
market to the detriment of the world’s workers (Rothkopf 266). Others view it as a big headed 
parade with meaningless discussion and few results beyond incensing the nationalists, 
antiglobalists, and conspiracy theorists. Bloomberg Businessweek columnist Bruce Nussbaum 
may be among them in stating, “Davos Man has nothing left to say,” in response to the 2011 
meeting (Nussbaum). Still yet, there are those who view the forum as a constructive attempt to 
increase awareness of the world’s pressing issues among those with means to resolve them. 
While its relevancy, fairness, and value are contested, in any case, it is a platform for dialogue 
and a link for major representatives in arenas that extend beyond those of the traditional elite, 
including “politics, culture, religion, media, and civil society” (Rothkopf 267).   
 
A Brief History of the World Economic Forum 
A brief history of the World Economic Forum and the events it has fomented echoes 
changes in the world at large and the place the global elite hold in it. As 2011 marks the 41st 
year of the World Economic Forum, much has changed since its inception as a group of 
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European business leaders meeting in Davos with the intent of catching up to American 
management practices (“History”). Before the organization’s inception in 1971, the deterioration 
of embedded liberalism in the 1960s, evidenced by a global “stagflation” of rising 
unemployment and inflation, created domestic and international economic policy concerns for 
European business (Harvey, “A Brief History” 12). In 1971, the end of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates back by gold reserves, precipitated by the U.S.’s decision to 
abandon the gold standard, created an insecure system where the U.S. dollar became the sole 
backing of currencies for the 44 allied nation members (Harvey, “A Brief History” 12).  
In the following chasm of a guiding economic political theory, Western reactionary 
movements became polarized between “social democracy and central planning on the one 
hand… and the interests of all those concerned with liberating corporate and business power and 
re-establishing market freedoms on the other” (Harvey, “A Brief History” 13). The interests of 
the latter group, promoted by swift mobilization efforts, clearly won out. Under the title of the 
European Management Forum, the non-profit organization’s annual meetings soon extended to 
economic and social issues, and political leaders, but remained closed to the ideas of the 
corporatist thinkers, and socialist and communist parties in Europe (“History”). By 1987, the 
year of finance’s “Black Friday” when stock markets across the globe crashed, the organization 
expanded its focus to resolving international conflicts, then under the name of the World 
Economic Forum, WEF (“History”). 
According to the WEF’s site, the annual meetings have spurred economic reform policies 
in China, the 1988 signing of the Davos Declaration by Greece and Turkey preventing their war, 
the first ministerial-level meetings between North and South Korea, a symbolic joint appearance 
of Nelson Mandela and the South African President F. W. de Klerk, and other such milestones of 
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international cooperation (“History”). For better or worse, the meeting indubitably builds bridges 
between frighteningly elite entities. This past meeting in January witnessed signatures for two 
joint ventures between gas and oil companies: the Rosneft-ExxonMobil partnership for 
“pioneering” offshore oil industry in the Black Sea, and the Rosneft-BP project on the 
development of the essentially untouched Russian continental shelf in the Arctic (“Russia and 
Exxon Mobile”). Klaus Schwab revels in these tangible and purpose oriented outcomes of the 
organization he chairs, as they defy accusations that the forum has no real policy implications. 
He also emphasizes the relative expansion of stakeholders and the number of public-private 
partnership initiatives to reflect an understanding of the “epochal transformation” occurring in 
the world (Rothkopf 271). The WEF established a Centre for Public-Private Partnerships to 
interconnect local companies, NGOs, and governments, as best demonstrated by its global health 
initiative (“History”). Decades of expanding its activities, membership, and focus have left the 
WEF with some legitimized results and at least a continued impetus to concretely prove its 
relevance.  
 
WEF Membership 
The WEF still faces much criticism beyond that of its substance, not least of which 
surrounds its members. The WEF has created a system of membership that consists of "the 1,000 
leading companies of the world," global enterprises with more than five billion dollars in 
turnover (“Strategic Partners”). Membership does not come cheap, or without attached corporate 
interests. A ticket to join the other Davos “fat cats in the snow,” as fellow feline Bono so 
popularly phrased it, costs around $30,000 at the lowest estimate (Rothkopf 272). The thirty top 
8 
 
sponsors face additional fees around $300,000 a year, while another hundred pay around 
$150,000 a year, affording them more sway over the foundation’s initiatives (Rothkopf 272).  
A breakdown of the industries willing to pay the approximate $270,000 annually, as of 
2005, for an Industry Partner membership may indicate those corporate interests more 
represented in the WEF’s agendas (Pigman 23). In 2011, of the 377 Industry Partners belonging 
to the twenty listed groups organized by industry on the WEF site, three industry groups have 
almost twice as many members (or more) than any other: Banking and Capital Markets (41 
members); Institutional Investors, Sovereign Funds, Family Offices (51 members); and the 
largest group with 55 members, Private Investors (Private Equity, Hedge Fund and Venture 
Capital) (“Strategic Partners”). The three Industry Partner groups with the smallest membership, 
in fact, the three without any members, are: Automotive (which may be misleading as Travel and 
Transportation belong to other groups); Global Health and Healthcare; and Media, Entertainment 
and Information (however, Information Technology ranks fourth for largest group, with 26 
members). Providing more funding and playing a larger role than the forum’s “1000 Member 
companies,” the Industry Partners lack any global health or healthcare representation, while well 
over a third belongs to banking and investing.   
Evidently, the main sponsors are not completely diversified and despite declared efforts, 
neither are the forum’s Davos attendees. The wealthy and educated white male of European 
descent continues to epitomize the Davos man, while “women, Asians, Africans, and others from 
the developing world continue to be underrepresented” (Rothkopf 267). Klaus Schwab, however, 
boasts the integration of “additional groups,” such as NGOs (which have been critiqued for their 
dearth of expertise in economics) and religious leaders who now number around thirty attendees 
each year (Rothkopf 270). While there has been an inevitable expansion pertaining to the 
9 
 
professional arenas from which the leaders hail (largely indicative of contemporaneous zeitgeists 
and occupational transformations), such diversity is not equally reflected in terms of funding and 
sponsorship, as discussed earlier.   
Complete geographical representation is still lacking, even though the numbers of Indian 
and Chinese delegates are on the rise since recent years. Attendees are known to consider 
themselves “global citizens,” but that does not dismiss the significance of their de jure national 
citizenships. Figure 1 compares the Davos attendees’ nationalities as defined by place of work 
with the nations’ shares of global GDP in 2001 and 2011. To some extent, the chart reveals how 
the WEF demographically portrays the world. It is fair to ask: does the meeting reflect the reality 
of elites in their nationalities? Considering the organization’s Eurocentric origins, it is not 
surprising that Britain, Switzerland, and the United States are disproportionately favored as 
delegates, together comprising around half, compared to their contributions to world GDP, 
collectively less than a quarter. “Other rich countries” have witnessed a relative decrease in WEF 
representation, both as a percentage of all WEF delegates and in relation to their share of world 
GDP, which has increased. Developing countries, excluding India and China, have seen a 
decrease in representation at Davos as a percentage of all delegates since 2001, but now more 
closely correspond to their economic presence in terms of contribution to world GDP. Over the 
course of 41 years, the annual meeting has grown in size. Accordingly, while a nation’s 
representation may have decreased as a percentage of world representation in some cases, the 
nation’s aggregate number of delegates may have increased.  
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Figure 1. The WEF delegates and world GDP (“Who’s Who at Davos”)  
 
Source: http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/01/world_economic_forum 
 
“Global Citizens”: Denationalization of the Elite 
 As various sectors of the population, as identified by professional field, gender, and 
nationality, fall short of equal representation at the WEF annual summit, it becomes necessary to 
investigate the common characteristics of those who are there. What makes a Davos man? 
Dissecting the national representation at Davos is de rigueur for a complete and palpable analysis, 
but of equal importance is the denationalized representation at Davos. In 1776, Adam Smith’s 
observation in that proprietors of stock operate can operate beyond national boundaries proved 
especially prescient. The global elite culture is said to be homogenized as a result of 
globalization, removed from the culture of locality and deterritorialized. The frequently used 
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term “homogenized” is a marked one, employed liberally in reference to the elite. What it could 
be labeling may be a belonging to a specific culture that is more reliant on lifestyle than nation.  
Granting themselves “global citizenship,” members operate under the idea of global economic 
interconnectedness and integration where there is unification around a common elite (Falk 44). 
Richard Falk’s chapter on “The Making of a Global Citizenship” describes his acquaintance with 
a self-proclaimed global citizen, fittingly on a plane:  
What he meant, it turned out, was that his friends, his social network, his travels 
were all global; that he slept in the same kind of hotels whether he was in Tokyo 
or London or New York; that he talked English everywhere; that there was a 
global culture of experience, symbols, infrastructure, food, and music that 
constituted his way of life… His sense of being global partly expressed a loss of 
cultural specificity” (43). 
The “loss of cultural specificity” described by Falk may disregard the formation and 
existence of an elite culture. The global elite represent a demographic segmentation along 
economic, social, gendered, and political lines, or other divisions, rather than national ones. 
Those are all factors that characterize the elite and help form a common lifestyle and identity. 
Benedict Anderson’s belief that nations are imagined communities can be extended to the 
concept of an international elite identity. However, its imagined and arbitrary quality does not 
mean that its effects are any less real. The idea of a global lifestyle and shared experiences 
lacking local, ethnic distinction is not divergent from a cosmopolitan standard of living, or 
cultural hegemony. Especially in cities, the upper class can emulate lifestyles more similar to 
those of an equivalent class in a cosmopolitan area in a different country, or even continent, than 
to the lower class citizens who geographically live next to them. The originator of the term 
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“Davos man,” Samuel Huntington asserts that the central distinction between the public and 
elites is nationalism versus cosmopolitanism (“Dead Souls” 5). He describes cosmopolitanism as 
an “attempt to reduce or to eliminate the social, political and cultural differences between 
America and other societies” (Huntington, “Dead Souls” 16).  
The idea that Western taste is linked with a higher social class and modernization, 
apparent in class-conscious communities around the world, perhaps suggests that the 
“denationalized” culture may still favor certain countries. People are able to project a certain 
socio-economic class through their purchases, outward dress, and life style in general, and a 
tendency towards the West in those categories often indicates a higher status on the socio-
economic scale. The attribute of “having a language” (one that is usually English and sometimes 
French or another colonizing language) is a form of cultural capital, social distinction, and 
evidence of a certain amount of education (de Koning 59). In cosmopolitan Cairo, “having” 
English usually indicates that the individual attended a private language school, was born into a 
“better” family, and has a likelihood of working in the upper segments of the labor market (de 
Koning 60). Huntington describes the “globalizing elites” as living in a supranational 
“sociocultural bubble” where the standard language is “global speak,” a social science version of 
English (“Who Are We” 267). In an environment where class-based privilege and the benefits 
associated with it are often indicated through global (read American) commodities and a level of 
savoir faire in Western culture, a professed expertise in those things is almost strategic for the 
elite. From this, a global elite culture is somewhat fostered through linguistic hegemony, popular 
culture, and commodities as indication of a flattering modern identity. Commodities are a 
physical manifestation of economic status and cultural preference, and indicators of 
cosmopolitan style.  
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 Global citizenship, especially as portrayed in the media and by Falk, has a stake in 
consumerism that acts as “an homogenizing supermarket for those with those with the 
purchasing power” (Falk 50). Huntington asserts that as the global market replaces the national 
community, the global consumer supplants the national citizen (“Dead Souls” 8). It is considered 
democratic in that those with a high enough willingness to pay are included, minimizing the 
dividers of religion, race, and politics. In fact, much of the triumphalist discourse surrounding the 
Davos man pivots on the insignificance of conflict-ridden factors like religion that are 
historically linked with nationalism, as other values like democracy and entrepreneurialism draw 
the limelight.  Thomas Frank captures this in his concept of “market populism” which supposes 
that the free market is a more democratic organization than any form of democratically elected 
governments (xiv). An opponent to this line of thought, he portrays market populism as an 
ostensibly populist, but actually elitist mechanism at the nucleus of the new American consensus. 
From the heights of Davos, “the shrine of globalization,” the privatization, deregulation, and 
trade liberalization in line with market populism appear especially appealing and outwardly 
egalitarian as they reflect the alleged will of the markets rather than the finance ministers and 
corporate executives whom they recompense. In reality, the performance and existence of the 
markets is the product of macroeconomic policies, which are socially constructed and protected 
rather than naturally occurring (Danner and Young 86). Functioning under the imperatives of 
global business and devoid of the confines of discrimination or borders, market populism 
propagates social equality while empowering the dictatorial hierarchies of corporations and 
transforming their leaders into a class “of one of the wealthiest elites of all time” (Frank xiv).  
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In the fallout of the Great Recession, however, blind reliance on the effectiveness of the 
free market and its populism (not excluding Chicago School’s efficient market hypothesis1) as a 
global economic system came into debate. Globalization, “the economic ideology of Davos Man” 
based on efficient market theory, according to Businessweek columnist Bruce Nussbaum, has 
left many disadvantaged and the Davos man at the top one percent of society reaping in the 
profits from global banks and corporations. Of further concern is where the accountability falls 
when there is no strong transnational agenda in which the “global citizen” must participate. 
Alongside Nussbaum, the director of the financial crisis documentary Inside Job, Charles 
Ferguson, indicates that it falls to the nation-state and the local taxpayer to save the failed banks 
and businesses driven into collapse by Davos man. “Superclass” members become a social force 
with increasingly fewer connections to their native populace, but increasingly greater influence 
on the political and economic systems of the world, rather than acting merely within their 
electorate boundaries. Concern lies in the presence of civic responsibility and whether it is 
transferred to the global level. As Ferguson identifies a new influx of risky and unethical 
members to the elite class, concern of civic responsibility at the national level also exists, but the 
potential for exploitation outside that realm is even greater.  
Differences in philosophy towards the meaning of national identity that occur between 
the elite and general citizenry beget differences in national interests and policy priorities 
(Huntington, “Dead Souls” 5). Elites are more involved in the globalizing processes and that is 
often where their interests and identities lie, at a deeper transnational level than non-elites 
(Huntington, “Dead Souls” 6). As a result, national policy often veers from public interest and 
                                                          
1
 The efficient market hypothesis that emerged from University of Chicago’s finance department holds that the 
stock market is the most efficient and rational mechanism as stock prices inherently reflect all available 
information (Nocera). Many scholars and market professionals attribute the recent financial crisis to financial 
leaders’ strict adherence to the efficient market hypothesis, which led them to underestimate the dangers of the 
asset bubble’s burst (Nocera). 
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towards the views of the elite. Huntington depicts the divergence in interests between the 
American public and elites as attributable to the elite’s inclination towards participating in the 
global economy over the physical and societal securities that are the concern of the public, a 
phenomenon surely not limited to the United States (“Dead Souls” 5). While the American 
public’s concerns involve a certain sustainability of the “existing patterns of language, culture, 
association, religion and national identity,” the elites are more focused on “supporting 
international trade and migration, strengthening international institutions, promoting American 
values abroad, and encouraging minority identities and cultures at home” (Huntington, “Dead 
Souls” 5).  
The economic transnationalism that is at the core of the global elite seems on a warpath 
to erode national boundaries and preserve national governments only to the extent that they 
facilitate its own operations. While this idea is fundamentally dualistic, rising corporate power 
has co-opted the state into a role of assistant to interstate competition and its favorable terms for 
corporate leadership. Such conditions call for global capital and minimal trade barriers between 
states, but nationally fixed labor and state legislation preserving property rights. Consequently, 
leaders in policy and major institutions have become decreasingly representative of the 
nationally fixed labor, the American people, who are increasingly withdrawn from the political 
system. American elites have a significantly greater tendency towards liberalism, irreligiosity, 
and cosmopolitanism, ideologies that link to a greater focus on globalization and transnational 
issues, than the general American public.  
For decades, major foreign policy leaders have disproportionately favored an active U.S. 
role in the world, U.S. military force to defend other countries, action in international crises 
without allies’ support, economic globalization, the reduction or elimination of tariffs, and 
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immigration (Huntington, “Dead Souls” 13). A 1998 poll revealed differences ranging from 22 
to 42% in the views of the public and those of a representative group of foreign policy leaders on 
34 major issues (Huntington, “Dead Souls” 13). Some studies signify that changes in public 
opinion have resulted in a declining level of corresponding changes in public policy since the 
1970s. Governmental policy has been increasingly less responsive to public opinion. Predictably, 
the late twentieth century was witness to a reduction in government trust and political 
participation, and a rise in alternative policymaking initiatives in America (Huntington, “Dead 
Souls” 14). Even with 100 million fewer Americans in 1960 than in 2000, more people watched 
the October presidential debates in 1960 than in 2000, evidence to the erosion of representative 
democracy and trust in governing leaders as the nation’s elites are increasingly divorced from 
their country (Huntington, “Dead Souls” 14).  
 
Davos Man: Filling the International Void? 
 Evidently, these globally-focused elites have created a widening chasm between their 
interests and those of the national citizenry, whom they are often meant to represent. But do they 
serve a more purposeful role outside the national realm? The superclass has thrived on 
capitalizing on the empty spaces between nations, but few have asked whether their presence in 
many of these spaces is better than none at all. In the absence of a world government, the 
transnational elite are often at the fore of the initiatives, corporations, and meetings filling this 
void. Events like the World Economic Forum act as symbols of the virtual political network of 
the global leadership. They are “informal mechanisms of power” on an international level 
(Rothkopf 265). Control over the global market bears strong influence in many ways, both 
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positive and negative, and connections among the global leadership class can also yield an array 
of results. In one contemporary intellectual line of thought regarding transnationalism, that of the 
moralist approach, international law, institutions, and cultures occupy a higher moral ground 
than those on the national level as they belong to the “worldwide community of human beings” 
according to University of Chicago’s Martha Nussbaum (qtd. in Huntington, “Dead Souls” 9). 
While the moralists reject the processes of national order in the face of international sovereignty, 
they advocate nationally led participation in international tribunals, such as the UN General 
Assembly or the International Criminal Court (Huntington, “Dead Souls” 9). Little is said in 
regards to the international institutions and processes not installed by national governments or 
democratically based which may arise through media, religion, markets, or other means, and be 
controlled by the transnational elite.  
 Richard Falk claims there is an idealistic component of the elite dedicated to 
transnational activism through rationalist strategy that has emerged since the 1980s (42). 
Transnationally raising a political consciousness on issues ranging from the environment to 
women’s movements, political and professional networks have evolved to the point where they 
surpass government initiatives in some cases (Falk 47). Amnesty International, a 
nongovernmental global movement campaigning for human rights in over 150 countries, is one 
such example where stakeholders rather than governments are directing the action (“Who We 
Are”). Rothkopf also touches on a subset of activism and philanthropy in the superclass, perhaps 
not unlike that of robber baron Andrew Carnegie, that he labels “enlightened globalization” 
(281). Another label he uses, “conspicuous conscious,” reveals the theme of image control 
among the elite, using philanthropy to mollify a backlash or establish a legacy (Rothkopf 17).
 Whether this activism mitigates the other actions of the superclass is dubious, but the fact 
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that some of these programs are forming government-size commitments to global issues speaks 
to their position in transnational governance. One such elite-driven organization, the Clinton 
Global Initiative, is lauded by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman for engaging its 
elite network to raise billions for world problems and step in as a global social safety-net while 
concurrently at the UN General Assembly “Hugo Chávez was accusing the president [Bush] of 
being the devil and Ahmadinejad was promoting his idea that the Holocaust was a myth” (qtd. in 
Rothkopf 282). The WEF itself generates over $85 million a year in tax-free revenue, which is 
incidentally the same amount the World Bank will loan to Mozambique’s 2011 budget (“WB 
Supports Mozambique”). The WEF, Clinton Global Initiative, and other projects of the 
superclass have an enormous potential for transnational activism in lieu of an efficient global 
authority. At the WEF annual meetings, social issues are sprinkled into the program in between 
the more highly attended business and economic discussions. Whether or not their presence is 
simply meant to challenge the protestors and “defuse criticism”, attention to such issues could 
influence agenda-setters like Bill Clinton and Bill Gates, Bills with bills to give (Rothkopf 276). 
 Intensified globalization has exacerbated the issue of global problems and the weakness 
of global institutions. Government regulation, passed and enforced at a national level, is the 
typical solution to free rider problems. Transnational issues such as environmental degradation 
and resource sustainability that extend beyond national borders have proved especially difficult 
to resolve as state actors act according to self-interest. A stiff free-market proponent and author 
of The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman believes that the need for national sovereignty will 
always trump an official global governance, and that in its place, transnationally operating NGOs 
and global coalitions will fill the gaps in particular issues (Rothkopf 177). For Friedman, NGOs 
and multinational corporations are simply global competitors in a “flat” world of equal 
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commercial opportunity. He also describes an emerging nexus between major multinational 
corporations (including Wal-Mart, Nike, and McDonald’s) and NGOs through supply chain 
negotiations (Rothkopf 177).  
NGOs garner more of the public’s trust than governments and businesses, and have an 
estimated worldwide turnover above one trillion dollars a year, demonstrating their growing 
influence.  (Rothkopf 177). The rise of NGOs and similar operations to fill the international void 
left by governments is seen as both commendable and flawed. Owing to their often undemocratic, 
elitist, and unaccountable nature, NGOs can pose as “Trojan Horses for neoliberalism,” in the 
words of social theorist David Harvey (“A Brief History” 177). Issues abound with 
accountability as such organizations are influenced by their voluntary funding, making them 
more vulnerable to the whims of superclass members. Such public-private collaboration has 
become a large factor of the international order, as part of the management of running counterfeit 
trade, containing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, distributing medicine, and other 
numerous cross-border activities that have moved beyond individual nations’ jurisdictions 
(Rothkopf 178). 
 In contrast to such public-private collaboration, Rothkopf also describes the informal 
evolution of public-public institutions to fill the weaknesses global governance. This includes 
networks of political leadership members, whether trade ministers or senior military officers, 
connecting from different countries in the same informal ways as typified by members of the 
superclass (Rothkopf 179). For example, NATO and joint military-to-military initiatives have 
enabled members to develop relationships with their foreign professional counterparts and 
eliminate the bureaucracy (Rothkopf 179). Other informal meetings such as those of the heads of 
states within the G7 and G8 precipitate influential coordination in global policy. Derivatives of 
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such groupings, other clusters of political leaders have formed, including the G20, the G77, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mercosur, the Organization of African States, 
and the Non-Aligned Movement (Rothkopf 181). The WEF meetings similarly bond the political 
superclass in light of varying objectives and clout. Illustrating the social effect, former 
Singaporean ambassador to the UN Kishore Mahbubani claims that the golf games of regularly 
meeting ASEAN country leaders have kept Southeast Asia from going to war (Rothkopf 182). 
These caucuses that unite powerful leaders and countries informally and institutionally determine 
much of the public feature of globalization. Joined with financial and business leaders from the 
private sector, their collaboration presides over far-reaching decision making.  
 The failures of national government in the global arena and the absence of a world order 
have opened many opportunities for members of the superclass to mobilize and forge their own 
outlook for globalization. The rising NGOs, global initiatives, and informal political groups to 
join countries were born from the same conditions that developed the WEF and Davos man. In 
the void left by the failure of governments to act, the Davos man has succeeded with relatively 
loosely regulated international finance, transnational business operations, and even illegal global 
trade. One of the more dangerous international voids has allowed a burgeoning arms industry 
with intertwining networks of legal arms trade and black-market trade (Rothkopf 220). The death 
toll of military conflicts by small arms, somewhere between sixty thousand and ninety thousand 
a year, falls on the world’s poorest citizens, far away from the interests of policy and business 
leaders (Rothkopf 220). Yet this is also a realm where global actors, especially the shadow elite 
of arms producers, are profiting and gaining power. For better and for worse, the transnational 
elite have expanded operations and filled international gaps apace of burgeoning globalization, 
perhaps “only following the economic incentives that government policy laid out for them” as 
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per Peter J. Wallison explaining the financial crises. But what if it is these elite that laid out the 
policy for government? 
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CHAPTER 2. A Transnational Extension of Mill’s Framework of the U.S. Power Elite 
“Power is not of a man. Wealth does not center in the person of 
the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be 
celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major 
institution” (“C. Wright Mills”). 
       --C. Wright Mills 
 
 In his oft-cited 1956 book “The Power Elite,” sociologist Charles Wright Mills explores 
the characteristics and domains of power of the leadership of the upper class in America. He 
concludes that the institutionally based power elite, joined by their common experience, interests, 
and outlook, dominated the U.S. since World War II (Domhoff, The Power Elite xv). George 
William Domhoff expands and updates Mills’ theories of a dominating American political and 
economic elite class in his 1990 book, The Power Elite and the State, and more recent 
publications. The existing theories of the power elite are conceptually restricted to a specific 
national boundary, that of the U.S., and do not fully take into consideration the effects of 
globalization and its epochal transformation. In the twenty-first century, lack of such factors 
renders the analysis of the professional elite obsolete in certain respects. However, the theory of 
the power elite is well developed and offers keen insight into the structures, backgrounds, and 
characteristics of the modern transnational elite. With a large portion of the transnational elite 
possessing American passports, trends within the American power elite are indicative of the 
global reality. It is only through examination of the social formation and organizational structure 
of the American power elite that one can understand the similarities and differences in the new 
denationalized and globalized superclass. This chapter will attempt to use Mills’ and Domhoff’s 
framework of the power elite in America to analyze the superclass and extend it to the 
transnational realm.  
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Further Defining the Transnational Elite as a Basis for Comparison 
Before expanding the existing framework of the power elite, one must understand the 
group to which it is being extended. Herein lie the difficulties of the analysis: there are 
inconsistencies and ambiguity in defining the parameters of the transnational elite, and a 
deficiency in any explanation of the metrics used. Elitism is a tiered phenomenon; within the top 
one percent of the economic elite (about 40 million quasi-millionaires), there are 95,000 
individuals with financial assets over $30 million (Rothkopf 38). The top one percent of that 
smaller group comprises the world’s roughly 1,000 billionaires (Rothkopf 38). “Davos man” is 
an ambiguous term often used at varying specificities. Depending on the author, it may refer to 
those who attend the WEF summit in Davos, Switzerland, or more generally to the class that the 
attendees represent. The definition of this class is even less precise. Listings such as TIME 
magazine’s 100 most influential people tend to be based more on current celebrity and recent 
media coverage than veritable power. For example, TIME’s 2011 list includes tennis player Kim 
Clijsters, twenty-three-year-old actress Blake Lively (of the TV series Gossip Girl), and Prince 
William and Kate Middleton (included as one entity) (Stengel). Rothkopf provides the most 
concrete delineation of the class he terms the “superclass,” for which he has gathered (in an 
unclear manner2) an unpublished list of over six thousand members from across the globe. 
Noting the imperfections in taking a superclass census, Rothkopf composes a group of: 
                                                          
2
 Rothkopf’s metrics for determining the superclass include: “the top officials of the 120 or so governments that 
have the ability or any proven inclination to meaningfully impact through design or through calamity on major 
populations beyond their borders;” leaders of the most powerful militaries; and “the key executives from the 2000 
biggest corporations, from the 100 richest financial institutions, and from the 500 or so largest global investment 
firms” (39). He adds an indiscriminate number of leaders of major NGOs, international institutions, religions, 
terrorist groups, crime, and the blogosphere. Equally vague, he appends globally influential “leading thinkers, 
scientists, academics, and artists” (39). Regardless of wealth, Rothkopf limits his list to those who regularly 
implement their international power (40). 
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…leaders of the biggest companies, the biggest banks and investment firms, 
governments and political parties, military organizations, media organizations, 
religious groups, NGOs, as well as members of the shadow elites, those whose 
influence stems from illicit or unconventional means, from terrorists to the most 
important bloggers (289).  
While the specific names are ephemeral, the advantage of a list is the demographic data 
that can be drawn from it and the fact that it provides a fairly lucid classification and focus. 
Rothkopf sees the WEF meeting in Davos as the largest gathering of superclass members, but 
does not see everyone at Davos as a superclass member. Depicting a portion of the few thousand 
Davos attendees as relatively insignificant people, has-been power players, and wildcards that 
came in with the luggage, Rothkopf estimates between five hundred and one thousand are true 
members of the global superclass (275). In the media, however, the term “Davos man” is often 
used to imply a larger group like that of Rothkopf’s superclass.  
Huntington coined the term “Davos man” to describe a much more inclusive group of 
“economic transnationals” at the core of the emerging global “superclass” with “little need for 
national loyalty” (“Dead Souls” 8). There is reason for confusion when he uses the term 
“superclass” to imply a drastically larger group than the superclass of Rothkopf. He set their 
number as large as twenty million in the year 2000, of whom eight million were American. 
These numbers place a little under three percent of Americans in the superclass. While forty 
percent of the world’s transnational elites were American, according to Huntington, less than 
four percent of Americans were transnational elites (“Dead Souls” 8). Huntington predicted the 
number of transnational elites to double by 2010. He later expanded this group to include not 
only global citizens but also elites intent on imposing their global agenda.  
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While Huntington’s class is significantly larger, Falk does not specify which class, or any 
specific size. Falk divides the global citizenry into five overlapping categories, including an elite 
global business people that share interests and experiences, but lack any global civic sense of 
responsibility (43). In addition to the man or woman of transnational affairs, Falk characterizes 
other categories with more grassroots activism: the global reformers, managers of environmental 
and economic global order, regional political consciousness, and transnational activists (45). 
These categories are not mutually exclusive or free from the connections of geography, and each 
includes elite members. Though frequently used in academia, and even recently by President 
Obama, the “global citizenship” is a purely theoretical concept that remains undefined. 
Consequently, scholars, journalists, and even Davos attendees use these varying terms and 
concepts interchangeably with different implications.  
At the national level, Mills studied thousands of American leaders and their social 
backgrounds, education, and careers (Domhoff, The Power Elite xv). Half a century since his 
findings, one would expect the size of the American power elite to only grow. For clarity 
purposes, I will use Rothkopf’s concept of the transnational elite as a basis of comparison with 
the power elite. Rothkopf acknowledges that the role of the U.S. power elite in the years 
following World War II is analogous to the role of the superclass in the hierarchy of a twenty-
first century globalized world (9). 
 
The Power Elite of Mills and Domhoff 
Mills’ definition of the power elite, “the managerial reorganization of the propertied 
classes into the more or less unified stratum of the corporate rich," distinguishes the elite from 
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the ruling class, which is based on birthright and social relations (147). The superclass too is 
defined by overt authority and influence within major institutions, which may include or have 
disproportional links with the ruling class. Domhoff elucidates the distinction between the ruling 
class and the power elite; The power elite comprises the leaders of the upper class and their 
organizations’ top-tier employees , who control the organizations that manifest class rule, as 
opposed to directly ruling (The Power Elite 17). This jives well with the transnational elite, 
whose identity is largely professionally and institutionally defined, but also often correlated with 
social or ruling status. Huntington similarly asserts that it is through a variety of institutions, 
organizations, and networks, albeit transnational ones, that the global elite is formed. He also 
claims that involvement in these activities, such as the WEF, is part of achieving a national elite 
status (Huntington, “Dead Souls” 8). 
This opens another gray area of the transnational extension. When certain nations wield 
vast international clout culturally, politically, and militarily, their elite members likely wield 
international clout. Whatever the administration, the president of the U.S. will be an obvious 
member of the global elite. The lines from nationalistic identity to transnational are often blurred. 
When one third of the world’s billionaires are American, there is a distinct possibility of a 
hegemonic American culture linked with the global one (“The World’s Billionaires”). The 
makeup of the global elite is without a doubt disproportionately Western. According to Rothkopf, 
one of the key elements uniting the superclass in their power over world affairs is geography. 
This matter relates to the overlapping spheres of Americanization and globalization. The 
connection between the American elite culture and a cosmopolitan one is such that using the U.S. 
as the example of a national elite to be globally extended is a natural choice.  
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Are the American power elite substantially different from the global superclass? The 
denationalization of the global elite is a key feature, but is it mutually exclusive from patriotism 
and is it self-defined? These are some of the questions that need to be addressed in the evaluation 
of a global class. Regarding America’s relation to the rest of the world, the Universalist line of 
thought dictates that other societies’ values are basically the same as or should be the ones 
espoused by America, which becomes a supranational empire (Huntington, “Dead Souls” 16). 
However, Huntington asserts that this concept is not a reality in the twenty-first century because 
of the presence of other power states in addition to the U.S. superpower (“Dead Souls” 16). For 
Huntington, cosmopolitanism and imperialism serve as social, political, and cultural buffers 
between America and other societies, but he does not ascribe a dominant nationality to those 
concepts (“Dead Souls” 16). The intersection between denationalization and nationalism is 
especially noteworthy in the U.S. as Americans have top rankings for patriotism and 
identification with their country while their elites are increasingly denationalizing, identifying 
themselves as global citizens. It seems that patriotism is sustained so long as it is economically 
advantageous. 
Central to the discussions of the power elite and transnational superclass, the concept of 
power is another nebulous area. Rothkopf opens his book with the pithy statement, “This is a 
book about power,” before expounding that through wealth, position, force, and access, the 
emerging global elite class has the highest concentration of it (xix). It is one of the first issues 
Domhoff tackles in “The Power Elite and The State,” as his analysis addresses the power of 
social classes, economic and state institutions, and political groups (The Power Elite xiii). A 
topic rarely directly broached in the social sciences, power is marked by revealing those who 
benefit, sit atop the occupational ladder, shape the political agenda, and are the major decision-
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makers (Domhoff, The Power Elite xiii). This definition easily extends to the international arena, 
as the Schwab-picked Davos attendees demonstrate these qualities at an international level. 
Domhoff finds that philosopher Bertrand Russell’s definition of power, “the production of 
intended effects,” has stood the test of time since 1938 (The Power Elite xiv). Russell does not 
make the assumption of a given social and economic structure that dictates power, which he 
emphasizes is a concept that “has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, 
influence on opinion” (qtd. in Domhoff, The Power Elite xiv). So too transnational elites gain 
their membership through the billionaire’s club, arms trade and military control, public positions, 
and sheer influence, and are more than mere cogs in the existing capitalist system.  
For both the power elite of Domhoff and Mills and today’s global power elite, there are 
interlocking venues of power, which raise claims of homogenization in both cases. As can be 
seen in the superclass, Mills’ well-networked elites were often part of a revolving door between 
government and business, occupying top responsibility roles across sectors. The occurrence of 
regulatory capture and apotheosis is nothing new; individuals find many incentives to move from 
regulating a specific field to working in the business of it, especially when the pay divide 
between public and private sector is sizeable and growing. Domhoff chalks up the coalition 
between business and state elites to uncertainty in organizations (The Power Elite 20). 
Governmental policy constitutes a major “uncertainty” for corporations, who seek to reduce this 
by placing those “similar” to themselves in governmental positions (Domhoff, The Power Elite 
20). It behooves them to elect political members with similar interests and common values. 
Another way to reduce uncertainty is to hire former government officials with insight into 
current and upcoming policies and social connections to the government. On the other side of the 
short fence, government organizations also seek corporate liaisons to “stabilize their environment” 
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(Domhoff, The Power Elite 20). A classic example of this “two-way street” for the elite is the 
military-industrial complex, which Rothkopf illustrates can be writ large for the global era. The 
difference between such an integrated power structure for the American power elite and for the 
superclass is that for the latter, the corporations become multinational and the number of 
government entities increases. 
The theory of uncertainty in organizations is also used to explain the tendency towards 
conformity and common traits within the elite, which by and large applies to the superclass. In an 
organization, positions involving the allocation of resources, uncertainty about future arising 
choices, and contacts outside the organization require fewer organizational constraints to work 
effectively, considering the nature of the position (Domhoff, The Power Elite 20). Such 
conditions are typical of major decision-making positions in an organization. In order for the top 
leaders of the organization to compensate for the greater uncertainty in the employee’s 
discretionary behavior, they seek out people who have internalized (or at least show willingness 
to promote) the same values as their own. This leads to similarities in dress, mannerisms, 
educational background, and personal interests. The professional pressure to “show exterior 
evidence of more profound underlying similarities to the top leaders” is nationally and globally 
manifest through the game of golf, for example, the aforementioned activity alleged to have 
prevented war between Asian countries (Domhoff, The Power Elite 21). “Exterior evidence” is 
most easily displayed through dress, which for the Davos attendees includes a uniform outlined 
by Rothkopf: “a dark coat, a well-tailored suit or blazer, and slacks” (10).  
While Mark Zuckerberg likely will not be seen in a business suit, even he complies with 
an implicit IT dress code. The emerging IT and Web elites do have differences from the standard 
elite (e.g. younger average age), but they still have certain political aptitudes, and traditional 
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financial and networking ties. The idea of a uniform, whether a hoody in the computer lab, a suit 
to an interview or Dress Blues in the Navy, reveals tacit signaling at all levels of society. 
Although a uniform may be nuanced, it is one of the more easily adopted mores. While some are 
born into a cultural set, there are also those who adapt into it, and those who “fake it to make it.” 
Along this spectrum of exterior values, the more one can demonstrate that the class values are 
internalized (if not conditioned since birth), the more likely he or she will be accepted into that 
class. As a black woman from a modest background, Condoleezza Rice had to adapt her habits 
and viewpoints to rise into the political elite as U.S. Secretary of State, on their terms. With a leg 
up from elite universities and networking (her undergraduate professor and mentor was 
Madeleine Albright’s father), and a switch in affiliation to the Republican Party, she assumed 
typical elite venues for ascendancy. The stigma of the nouveau riche and their alleged failure to 
adopt the subtleties of the upper class culture is evidence of the closed and intricate nature of 
class values and exterior evidence of it. While the superclass is more geographically and 
ethnically varied than the power elite, there is still a level of homogeneity in psychological traits, 
social background, values, and gender. According to Rothkopf, as far as a tendency towards risk, 
acumen, leadership, narcissism and obsessive and unempathetic personalities, the new global 
elites demonstrate many traits of the elites of the past (295). 
 
Mills’ Major Circles of Power 
 In examining the power elite of Mills and the more updated American power elite of 
Domhoff, still comprised largely of privileged, white, male, heterosexual Christians3, one can 
                                                          
3
 Domhoff’s correlation between the American power elite and Christianity may indicate more of a cultural 
association to the religion, tied to the largely Protestant history of the country, rather than a strictly behaviorally 
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draw comparisons to the emerging global elite class, better understand its social and power 
structures, and determine its new features (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff viii). Mills’ analysis 
construes the elite as belonging to the top command posts in three major institutions of American 
society: the executive branch of the federal government, business, and the military. Domhoff and 
Zweigenhaft follow Mills’ framework, studying the leaders and CEOs of the banks and 
corporations ranked largest by Fortune magazine’s annual rankings, the presidential cabinet 
appointees as part of the “political directorate,” and the same two highest positions in the 
military, the generals and admirals (5). As a sort of control group, they also conduct similar 
background studies on senators and Supreme Court appointments in order to consider differences 
in members of the electoral system and accord Congress and the Supreme Court a higher 
standing in the power structure (5). Even with the American public’s increasing alienation from 
politics, Domhoff and Zweigenhaft find greater diversity and differences in occupational and 
income backgrounds in the elected officials than in the power elite, coinciding with the idea of a 
homogenous elite class in some respects (1).  
Mills describes an overlap in the dominating groups in the “circles” of politics, business, 
and the military, insofar that they together create a small homogenized group whose combined 
decisions dictate decided national events (18). Developing the concept of the global power elite 
along Mills’ three societal hierarchies requires flexibility in methodology. Rather than analyzing 
key cabinet members and presidential advisors, one needs to look beyond a single administration 
and regard the highest political leaders across the globe in terms of international clout. Instead of 
analyzing high ranking officers in a single national military, one needs to consider international 
military action and joint ventures, and the main people who determine them. The owners and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
based association. This is an interesting note to compare with Huntington’s observation of the irreligiosity of the 
transnational elites in the US.  
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directors of major corporations can only be considered members of the global superclass if their 
actions have an impact that touches society around the globe.  
 
Military: 
 Military leaders maintain a role in exercising international power, but their cut of the 
power pie has lessened since World War II. Rothkopf claims that the relative decline is 
attributable to the high cost of modern warfare, and the rise of other forms of elites, from 
financial to “shadow” (xiv). However, with world military spending around one trillion dollars, 
military elites still bear substantial influence (Shah). National militaries, especially the U.S.’s, 
can still alter the lives of millions, if not billions, with their actions. Leaders of their joint 
coalitions then wield even more power, depending on the combination of member countries. 
International military organizations include the Collective Security Treaty Organization, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, South 
Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, and the Warsaw Pact. Those who direct such 
organizations are or were high officials in their national militaries.  
Then there is the sub-organ of the UN Security Council, the Military Staff Committee. 
The fifteen members of the UN Security Council, including permanent members China, France, 
Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. (all nuclear powers with veto rights), have the power to authorize 
military action towards the maintenance of international peace and security. Interestingly, those 
five permanent members of the UN Security Council are five of the ten largest arms exporting 
countries in the world (Shah). The permanency of the five members and their individual ability 
to strike down any proposal create issues with promoting national rather than international 
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interests. Correspondingly, representatives to the Security Council from those five countries with 
veto power hold significantly more sway in global military action. The main military component 
contribution to the UN is a peacekeeping force, which is commanded by a force commander 
(“UN Military Roles”). Commanders of a UN force hold the rank of Major-general or 
Lieutenant-general and generally have between thirty and forty years of experience (“UN 
Military Roles”). These force commanders are UN staff members and active duty members in 
their national armed forces who retain national command over their own troops (“UN Military 
Roles”). Due to the maintenance of national military structures and the dominance of certain 
national armed forces, members of the military global elite likely closely resemble those of Mills’ 
American power elite, despite relatively less power and a more complicated and integrated 
global structure.  
While national militaries may join forces for international missions, they are part of the 
prevention of a world government, as they are geared to defend their nation-state’s sovereignty. 
They often stand where international institutions are weak; the UN, for example is regularly 
criticized for its weakening credibility, relevance, and effectiveness. The UN itself acknowledges 
that, “military capability, particularly in specialized capacities such as communications, aviation, 
engineering, and medical and logistic support, is often difficult for the UN to obtain” (“UN 
Military Roles”). In terms of global military elites, geography and nationality matter. 
  Of the approximately 200 armies in the world, the U.S. military is irrefutably the most 
powerful, owing to its size, space, resources, and technology that lead it to be the only army 
currently capable of waging modern global warfare (Rothkopf 38). Rothkopf asserts that “there 
are fewer than twenty [armies] with any kind of missile capability, only nine with nuclear 
weapons capability, only six armies with roughly 500,000 or more troops, only three air forces 
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with more than one thousand planes” (38). With an annual defense expenditure larger than the 
rest of the world’s defense budgets combined (over $630 billion in 2007), more than 10,000 
nuclear warheads, and over 2.5 million military personnel, the U.S. stands out as a military 
superpower (Rothkopf 41). As commander in chief, President Obama holds the ultimate 
command and control over this superpower. However, with the waning viability of the power of 
force, the U.S. military finds itself with unparalleled war and technology capabilities, including 
thermonuclear arsenal, but failed missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Rothkopf 86). Rothkopf 
considers the recent predominance of such conflicts of asymmetry to be the biggest structural 
change of the global military-industrial superclass (195). 
 Rothkopf cites the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry since the mid-1990s to be 
another significant change (205). The long-standing relationship between the government 
defense leadership and the leadership in defense contracting creates a situation where the current, 
unprecedented rate of merging suppliers and contracting firms leads to an even higher 
concentration of military power. According to Rothkopft, over 50 major American defense 
suppliers have consolidated into five or six firms in less than a decade, which means that the 
military-industrial superclass has also consolidated (205). Venues including the Munich 
Conference on Security Policy, Shangri-La Dialogue, and the WEF have only augmented the 
level of international networking among the military-industrial elite. A tightened international 
network of the industry’s leaders with an increasingly global orientation has led to increased 
international arms collaboration with foreign governments and firms overseas, including more 
information and weapons trading, joint ventures, and mergers (Rothkopf 207). For the top 
contractors and arms manufacturers, whose leadership positions and networks are highly 
correlated to those of secretaries of defense, war is very profitable. In their influential opinion, 
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the bigger the better, especially when it comes to weapons systems. The military-industrial 
superclass of “military professionals, civilian policy makers, arms manufacturers, and defense 
contractors” is maintaining their national connections and expanding globally (Rothkopf 208). 
 
Business:  
Business is another of Mills’ institutional circles of power where the U.S. is at the fore 
globally. In relation to his other two circles of power, it is itself at the fore (apt terminology 
considering its relationship with golf). With the boom of finance and other sectors, and their 
greater independence from national restrictions, business is the dominant circle of power, 
overshadowing the military and political structures. Like Mills’ other social institutions, it too 
has been subjected to elements of change and internal shifts of power. As the aforementioned 
grouping of WEF strategic partners implies, some sectors have prospered more than others. The 
leading managers and entrepreneurs in hedge funds, technology, and private equity investment 
are the crux of today’s global elite businessmen (Rothkopf 144).  
The reformation of the elite in the U.S. favored financiers, corporate CEOs, and those 
leading new sectors in computing and information technologies (e.g. Bill Gates), media (e.g. 
Rupert Murdoch), and retailing (e.g. the Walton family) (Harvey, “A Brief History” 31). The 
changes in other nations’ elite classes had different focuses in some cases. Britain’s class power 
has lessened the significance of aristocratic power and supported a new class of entrepreneurs 
and nouveaux riches (Harvey, “A Brief History” 31). In some South Asian countries, economic 
power related to trading and cornering markets converged among a small group of ethnic-
minority Chinese (Harvey, “A Brief History” 31). The collapse of the USSR paved the way for 
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the Seven Oligarchs in Russia. While the national elite have changed in various ways from 
country to country, their contribution to the highest global elite still demonstrates broad patterns. 
National elites do not bear the same global influence from country to country. The CEO of the 
largest U.S. fast food franchise, McDonald’s, has a heavier weight on the global scale than the 
CEO of Zimbabwe’s largest fast food franchise, the Google Search of which tellingly yields 
results related to McDonald’s. General changes in the American elite and other core nations’ 
elites are fairly illustrative of the global power elite at large. 
According to Rothkopf in 2008, half of the top twenty-two companies in the world were 
led by Americans (143). By 2010, that changed to less than a third (exactly one third when 
considering the top thirty corporations), using information from Fortune’s 2010 rankings of the 
world’s largest corporations4 (“Global 500”). For a country whose citizens represent five percent 
of the earth’s population, that still reveals a high concentration of corporate power (Rothkopf 
143). In fact, with a 2010 GDP of $14.62 trillion, the U.S. accounts for close to a quarter of the 
gross world product (GWP), $62.27 trillion (“World Fact Book”). But Fortune’s annual 
standings show that even within a few years, the composition and origin of the leading 
companies and their CEOs may change. In 2010, Japanese and Chinese CEOs were heading half 
of the ten largest companies, the other half being transatlantic (“Global 500”). With a Swedish 
CEO, French company Carrefour, at number 22 on the list, demonstrates another telling point: 
the top companies are not the only ones shifting in nationality; their employees are shifting 
nationality too. Rothkopf’s ten biggest corporations5 had approximately 60% of their employees 
employed outside the company’s country of origin in 2006 (120). They also saw around that 
same percent of their revenue come from operations outside that country (Rothkopf 120). In 
                                                          
4
 See Appendix B. 
5
 Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, General Motors, Chevron, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Ford, ConocoPhillips. 
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contrast to the labor they hire, corporate leaders are pro-internationalist, abandoning nationalism 
in pursuit of capital gains and cheap labor. This attitude creates competition among nations, 
especially the nation of origin, for corporations’ investment. As the role of the state shifts to 
serve the upper class and accumulators of capital, so does its power shift to corporations and 
Wall Street. 
Andrew Liveris, CEO and Chairman of The Dow Chemical Company, is on the executive 
committee of the Business Roundtable, a politically conservative association of CEOs in major 
American companies that together comprise nearly a third of the total value of the U.S. stock 
market (Liveris). Liveris’ language regarding the state’s role in policy is standard of the 
corporate elite’s pro-business and pro-deregulation stance: “Regulations are beneficial only when 
they’re clear, consistent and wise. And, in large part, the U.S. regulatory regime is so complex 
and inconsistent that regulations hinder American manufacturers without helping anyone in 
particular.” Following the Bush era and the Great Recession, public outcry and interest groups in 
America have pushed several new regulatory requirements and proposals, which members of the 
Business Roundtable view as a “troublesome” and “unprecedented avalanche” of requirements 
threatening “job creating businesses” (Liveris).  
Founded on the belief that “businesses should play an active role in the formation of 
public policy,” the Business Roundtable pinpoints the following regulations as threats to their 
potential revenues (and consequently to all those poor, marginalized Americans that may one day 
finally see the trickled down money): Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulations, Ozone National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), and Air Transport Rule (Liveris). The Business 
Roundtable also proposes reductions in “unfair” foreign barriers to U.S. exports, and closed gaps 
in “investment protection and international tax treatment” (“The Language of Trade”). Such 
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appropriate policies will purportedly allow America to simultaneously “win the race” for exports 
and jobs and “bring the benefits of trade and investment to the world’s poor,” in perfectly self-
seeking munificence (“The Language of Trade”). 
The area between private entities and state politics is very gray, especially when 
regarding political parties (especially the Republican party) or the Business Roundtable. It 
becomes very clear that capital power equates to political power, and thus can transcend national 
boundaries. The organizations of businesses with the backing of their tremendous resources, 
manage to infiltrate major social institutions, including “universities, schools, the media, 
publishing, the courts”, and alter the perception of the corporation (Harvey, “A Brief History” 
43). The ebbs and flows of the power of money create the ability for giving with conditions. The 
power of private entities has overcome that of the state in many cases.  
The tendency towards monopolies, to the detriment of the consumer or often even the 
producer, is indicative of a state failure to intervene. In fact, the state often intervenes on behalf 
of major corporations, as indicated by the Clinton administration’s overruling of attempted 
regulation of derivatives (or as Warren Buffet once called them, “weapons of mass destruction”) 
(Inside Job). Industries are ruled by few giant transnational corporations, which, as seen in the 
defense industry, are increasingly consolidated and centralized. A prime example of corporate-
pushed deregulation and consolidation, the 1999 reversal of the Glass-Steagall act in the U.S. 
removed the requirement to separate commercial banking from investment banking and 
securities firms, which has led to banks becoming bigger, more concentrated and more powerful 
than ever before (Inside Job). The values of the market that sustain neoliberal theory are not 
always upheld. The neoliberal free market and market populism do not equal competition and 
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fairness as the system is plagued with monopolization, centralization, conflicts of interest, and 
internationalization of corporate and financial power (Harvey, “A Brief History” 203).  
Unfair market conditions, exacerbated by uneven development across nations, joined 
with a lack of social protections, have led to an increase of inequality between classes and among 
the states (Harvey, “A Brief History” 203). While this phenomenon occurs within states, it is also 
more largely reflected internationally between states. Class contradictions within states manifest 
themselves outside of those intangibly constructed barriers. According to social theorist David 
Harvey, the largest class discrepancy is between the agrarian sector of the third world countries 
and the local bourgeois collaborators of these countries allying with the new global elite (“A 
Brief History” 203). National policies managing the distribution of wealth increasingly reflect 
the interests of the global corporate elite. Alongside vast reductions in corporate taxes, the tax 
rate for the highest bracket in the U.S. has approximately halved since 1970, while the tax rate 
for the lowest has remained relatively stagnant (Harvey, “A Brief History” 26). According to 
Inside Job’s Charles Ferguson, savings from the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 went 
predominantly to the top one percent of Americans (Inside Job). Addressing Chile’s enormous 
inequality across the population, the country’s business elite recently prescribed belief in the 
markets, patience, and low taxes for those creating jobs (Rothkopf 58). Inequality, also evident in 
the mounting compensation gap between workers and CEOs, has also surged in Eastern Europe, 
Mexico, China, former Soviet bloc countries to the countries’ highest levels (Harvey, “A Brief 
History” 17). The corporate elite are capturing a significantly larger share of national income 
worldwide.  
Rising inequality, and the consequent rising economic power of the elite, is an effect of 
elite-backed policies of trade liberalization, which in turn increases interstate privatization. Since 
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Mills’ writings, there has been a strong trend in privatization of public assets with the backing of 
the state, in the name of efficiency and profitability. This is tied to the rise of “accumulation 
through encroachment,” a feature of the capitalist world that sets itself upon the periphery states. 
In this context, multinational corporations can thrive off the trend of “’disinvestment’ of State 
sector equity and ‘privatization’ of State sector assets, invariably at ‘throwaway’ prices” (Patnaik 
2). Indian Marxist economist Prabhat Patnaik believes that privatization and the institutionalized 
corporate power alter the terms of trade against the peasantry and third world primary 
commodity producers who become easy prey for expropriation (Patnaik 3). The lack of global 
cohesiveness for effective environmental regulations often means that privatization across states 
further impairs the third world rural sector through the overexploitation of its resources, such as 
deforestation (Harvey, “A Brief History” 174). The goal of private entities is a maximized profit; 
this does not naturally align with all the goals of a state (for example private entities do not strive 
for full employment in a state, clean air or human rights). 
Beyond privatization, the emergence and explosion of the financial community have 
irrevocably shaped the face of business. At the head of the globalization process, finance has also 
grown to enormous success operating in unchartered international territories. Financialization 
serves as a neoliberal structure that fosters an elite class of rising CEOs and leaders in finance, 
insurance, real estate, and new growing sectors including Information Technology. Finance 
capital has come to dominate over other forms of capital, a fact that attests to the clout of its 
structures, motivations, and societal and political influences. The capitalist focus on production 
has shifted to stock values, whose fluctuations and perception motivate businesses to increase 
posted profits. This all too easily comes at the expense of worker payroll cuts, furthering the 
trend of inequality. In transnational corporations where the labor may be in periphery states, this 
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can mean regional inequality among states. The blending of financial services with the functions 
of larger corporations is a trend well-suited for centralization of capital power and establishment 
of class power (Harvey, “A Brief History” 157). There is similarly a shift from the traditional 
separation of ownership and management of corporations, to the fusion of the two, achieved 
through payment in stock options (signifying ownership) to CEOs. 
An engine for capital accumulation and select individual wealth, international finance 
acts as a driving force behind deflation and accumulation by dispossession. Financial 
mechanisms used to shift capital and power include securities, derivatives, and leverage, the 
betting off of currencies. Financialization provides a solution for overaccumulation with the 
creation of credit (another solution being the creation of desire for the consumer). Where 
expanded reproduction provided a solution for overaccumulation, mostly through state and 
government organized projects (e.g. the construction of bridges or highways), this long-term 
method was poorly received by neoliberal countries preferring short-term contracts and large 
profit margins for the elite (Harvey, “The ‘New’ Imperialism” 64). 
The centralization of financialization’s power allows for an almost predatory control over 
entire state economies, and an ability to invoke financial crises (Harvey, “A Brief History” 189). 
The recent global financial crisis, which Ferguson blames on the finance industry, lost tens of 
trillions of dollars and doubled the U.S. debt (Inside Job). The tendency to peg currencies, which 
effectively ruined the Russian Ruble and precipitated the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 
contagion, is a distinctive feature of the global impact of financialization (Patnaik 6). The 
privatization, state deregulations, financialization, and political actions promoted by the 
corporate elite are highly correlated with “soaring and uncontrollable internal budgetary deficits, 
a balance of payments crisis, rapid currency depreciation, unstable valuations of internal assets 
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(for example in property and financial markets), rising inflation, rising unemployment with 
falling wages, and capital flight” (Harvey, “A Brief History” 189). Such conditions typify 
financial crises across the globe from the 1980s through to the 1990s and even today (Harvey, 
“A Brief History” 94). 
 The finance community’s predisposition to minimal regulation (it will shell out billions 
towards lobbying to prevent reform), the fact that it is led by one small group, and the lack of a 
counterweight set it up to realize the conditions it finds attractive. For their numerical 
representation, the financial elite have a disproportionate role in determining the market. Their 
agenda resonates with international leaders and political decision-makers, to the point where U.S. 
economic decisions must be made in conjunction with finance (Rothkopf 151). U.S. Secretary of 
the Treasury, Timothy Geithner acknowledged that significant collaboration with the leaders of 
the world financial community is necessary to manage markets today, whether working with 
currencies, credit or derivatives (Rothkopf 174). When a dozen firms account for the 
preponderance of the market activity, the New York Fed listens to them. The Fed in turn 
manages relations with other central banks and the international financial community (Rothkopf 
174). Even after the global financial crisis and public outcry, the leaders in finance who would 
largely be responsible for the crisis’ conditions maintain their elite membership. Some of them 
now sit as Obama’s senior economic advisors, maintaining the status quo. Despite the hyped 
campaigning and public discourse, Obama’s 2010 financial regulations were weak and reflected 
little reform (Inside Job). 
The role of the state in redistribution, deregulatory incentives for privatization, and the 
drive for capital accumulation help create market-driven financialization and spectacular 
remuneration for its corporations’ leaders, intensifying the reconstitution of a global elite. The 
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size of corporate involvement economically and socially rivals that of states (and often their 
interests) to the point where states are compelled to collaborate. Mills’ grouping of “The 
Corporate Rich” functions at the international stage with greater national and international power 
than ever before. However, “The Corporate Rich,” with the finance community at the utmost 
echelons, have evolved to reflect the emergence and growth of transnational capital, new sectors, 
increased privatization, and the backing of states. 
 
Government: 
Mills far from predicted an equilibrium of power between elites and the masses, the 
management of which belongs to the government and systems of law (Rothkopf 144). Mills was 
witness to the formation of the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
the Geneva Conventions, the World Health Organization (WHO), the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB), 
forms of public international law which have all since evolved, expanded, and grown in use. 
However, as seen with the U.N., these organizations and agreements are plagued with issues of 
membership, relevance, accountability, enforcement, and undemocratic processes. Not one truly 
represents an overarching sovereign able to ensure compliance. Continued violations of 
international law by powerful states can effectively alter customary practices and the law itself. 
Regarding the recent global financial crisis, the IMF repeatedly warned the U.S. of an impending 
crisis, but was unable to get the U.S. to react, which highlights the futility of the international 
organization in exercising control over a dominant state (Inside Job). 
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Rothkopf describes the tension between internationalism and nationalism as a defining 
issue for the global political superclass, as national political institutions fail to provide a unified 
legal framework, but provide the track to success for political elites (159). It becomes obvious 
that the political elite of powerful states are by and large the global political elite. According to 
Rothkopf, domination in top U.S. policy jobs comes with ties to the foreign policy elites of 
governments around the world (149). Political elites tend to work the domestic system to achieve 
political power, but then reach the top to “discover” that the domestic issues around which their 
election and ascendency were based are not the most vital ones they face. The majority of the 
largest issues, rather than gay marriage or health care insurance, are internationally based or 
focused (Rothkopf 160). For G8 members, foreign political success is hardly a prerequisite for 
executive positions in policy. According to Rothkopf, four of the five American presidents 
elected before Obama had minimal international policy experience, a point for which Obama has 
also been criticized (148). The highest in the political superclass operate in a more national 
system then other superclass members, but still depend on foreign power centers (Rothkopf 189). 
State borders still largely define elite politicians, despite their increased global connections. 
As discussed in the last section, the roles of state governments have come to be more 
defined by their ability to create ideal conditions for business, rather than for individuals. Since 
Mills’ work, the political elite are more molded by capitalist efforts, and state policy is ruled by 
possessive individualism, where the individual comes to encompass corporations. The state’s 
role in the advancement of trade liberalization, privatization, and “accumulation through 
encroachment” lies in its jurisdiction over legality, the establishment of policy, and even the 
notion of nationalism. The rules for capital accumulation and their global application come to 
take precedence over the sovereignty of the states that are responsible for the enforcement of 
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these rules (Harvey, “A Brief History” 180). The ability to do business in a country is more 
important than the corruption or oppressive governments in it. 
The stability of the whole capitalist system rests on the state’s ability to control inflation 
and the integrity of its money, thus the social interests of the state become subordinate to the 
needs of private entities. The “deflation and ‘sound finance’” that are the “baggage of capitalism,” 
in the words of Prabhat Patnaik, become the state’s issues (Patnaik 5).  The state’s deflationary 
policies effectively lower the aggregate demand in the world economy, leading to a global 
centralization of capital (Patnaik 2). This centralization of capital favors the upper class, and 
disfavors the peasantry and third world states that often produce raw materials (Patnaik 2). 
Deflationary policies, including cuts in the government expenditure like those currently seen in 
Greece, lead to the privatization and commoditization of public goods and utilities (including 
water, healthcare, and education).  
The object of the neoliberal state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate for private property rights (which are mostly abstract and applied to the benefit of 
corporations), free markets, and free trade (Harvey, “A Brief History” 2). Led by the decisions of 
the political elite, the state now wages a war against inflation, rather than exploitation, corruption, 
or gaps in the social safety net. The state serves to further and promote the agenda of its 
corporate elite, thus it follows and promotes their interests, which are not limited to within their 
state. Another function of the state is the restriction of the power of trade unions and working-
class institutions to allow for a “flexible” labor market that becomes commoditized (Harvey, “A 
Brief History” 168). The pacification and reduced empowerment of the class of laborers 
represents the victory of capital over labor, a victory for the superclass (Harvey, “A Brief History” 
168). Privatization and withdrawal from expenditures in social provisions further undermine the 
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lower classes. State policies and tax code revisions effectively redistribute wealth to benefit the 
upper classes, the victors in the capitalist rat race. The social opposition that then arises from the 
inequalities embedded in accumulation by dispossession, especially in the third world, 
necessitates another state task, that of repression and social control, usually in conjunction with 
the military circle (Harvey, “A Brief History” 165). The revolving door, economic incentives, 
financialization, and networking of the elite encourage state officials not only to yield to 
privatization, but also to facilitate its progress through marginalization, deregulation, repression 
and redistribution, all processes benefiting the superclass.  
The path to international political leadership is usually paved with money, through under 
the table payments from businesses or individuals, the purchasing of media coverage, funds to 
lobbyists, or the financing of campaigns, all of which co-opt allegiance to voters (Rothkopf 83). 
In America’s system of campaign finance, probable presidential candidates have to raise over 
100 million dollars, which is about 25 times more expensive than a few decades ago (Rothkopf 
154). Donations to public officials are not without return, as is evident in Rothkopf’s list of the 
benefits and incentives:  
Access to senior officials, positions on presidential councils, top appointments for 
friends who share their views, seats on trade missions, interventions by U.S. 
officials to tailor elements of global regulations and tariff structures to the needs 
of specific industries whether through the WTO, via bilateral agreements, or 
through other channels, efforts to enforce intellectual property concerns and, from 
time to time, efforts to help play down conflicts that might threaten corporate 
interests (154). 
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Such an exchange system conflates democracy and free markets. Those with more control over 
the movement of money have more of a vote. Former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph 
Stiglitz makes the statement, “Wall Street votes as much as the people of the country,” as the 
liberalization of capital and its free movement in and out of countries give its elite more voting 
power, undermining democracy (Rothkopf 128). An interstate bidding war of policies results 
from the ease of shifting capital, labor supply chains, and corporate headquarters across borders.  
Voting power towards political office and specific policies is a direct form of power. It is 
through political institutions that resources are allocated, agendas set, laws and regulations 
created, and key ideas institutionalized (Rothkopf 85). A state’s power is positively correlated to 
the power of its political institutions, and thus the few individuals at the top of them. The U.S. is 
in a leading political condition where its hegemony is linked with global economic stability. The 
dearth of controls and imperial power to check it places Congress members, the President, and 
Cabinet members in immediate positions of international power. Supranational coalitions of 
weaker states do bear some potential to present challenges to American interests. Initiatives to 
bind blocs of states to a supranational law above the laws of nation states include: the political 
federation of the East African Community, the nascent Union of South American Nations, the 
European Union, and the Andean Community of Nations. However, such coalitions have yet to 
present a true challenge to American hegemony.  
 
Other Elements of the Global Power Elite 
The characters of Mills’ chapters, “The Celebrities,” “The Very Rich,” “The Warlords,” 
“The Military Ascendancy,” “The Chief Executives,” “The Corporate Rich,” and “The Political 
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Directorate,” still exist on a global level, and exhibit the same tendency to crossover and network. 
As much as the elite have evolved and been reconstituted at the global level, there remain 
prominent patterns and elements. Rothkopf identifies key elements of success that those 
individuals with unequal power over world affairs exhibit: geography, pedigree, networking and 
luck. Other factors typifying (but not defining) a global power elite include wealth (billionaire 
status especially), European or North American roots, and baby boomer status (Rothkopf 291).  
Rothkopf estimates around 60% of the superclass to be millionaires, which is indicative 
of the connection between money and power (292). The evolving list of billionaires (now at a 
record 1,210 billionaires) reveals demographic changes in the world’s largest accumulators of 
wealth (“The World’s Billionaires”). Forbes’ 2011 list shows twice as many Chinese billionaires 
as the previous year, and more billionaires in Moscow than any other city (“The World’s 
Billionaires”). While Americans are still the most common kind of billionaire, their piece of the 
pie has dropped about 25% in a decade as developing countries add to the list (“The World’s 
Billionaires”). Rothkopf cites the U.S. as home to the largest number of superclass members, 
having supersized their superclass to 17% (290). Although there are 195 countries in the world, 
only ten provide 57% of the superclass6 (Rothkopf 290). 
Below, Figure 2. illustrates Rothkopf’s breakdown of the superclass by sector (291). 
Business and finance dominate the superclass, with 63% considered top members of the business, 
financial, and investment community (Rothkopf 291). While the pie chart makes room for new 
elite clusters, such as the shadow elite, it does not reveal the changing demographics within 
sectors. 
                                                          
6
 The U.S., China, Britain, India, Brazil, Russia, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and France. 
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Figure 2. Superclass Members by Sector 
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 In 2007, Bush responded to the issue of rising inequality for the first time with: "The 
reason is clear: We have an economy that increasingly rewards education and skills because of 
that education” (Abramowitz and Montgomery). This may be true, but it does not necessarily 
exempt the state or make the process less elitist. The path towards entry into the superclass 
begins early, and most children are left behind. Education, whether at the secondary, 
undergraduate, or graduate level of study, combines pedigree and networking- two of Rothkopf’s 
key elements of success. Education is an example of the early-on networking that helps foster 
social circles and connections. The more elite connections one can forge, the higher the 
likelihood of elite status. In line with his theories towards the denationalized American elite, 
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Huntington notes that a higher level of education (or income) corresponds to a more conditional 
allegiance to a national community (“Dead Souls” 8). Huntington sees study abroad in foreign 
universities, time working abroad, and involvement with global-reaching organizations as 
characteristic of members of the “seceding elite” (“Dead Souls” 8). As the majority of study 
abroad programs are situated in urban areas, subsequent exposure to a cosmopolitan lifestyle and 
the accrual of cosmopolitan perspectives are not surprising.  
 U.S. military training programs are also opening up to international students, having 
already produced 200 years of American military elites in some cases (Rothkopf 197). Select 
American military programs carry enormous prestige abroad, furthering foreigners’ desire to 
create ties with them (Rothkopf 199). American undergraduate institutions such as the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point and the U.S. Air Force, alongside graduate or professional 
programs at National War College, the National Defense University, the Army War College, and 
the Naval War College, have historical roles as training grounds for the top cadres in their 
services and senior government (Rothkopf 197). Four of the last five U.S. Pacific Command 
(PACOM) commanders, along with a number of other professional naval officers, call the U.S. 
Naval Academy at Annapolis their Alma Mater (Rothkopf 197). Former president of Costa Rica 
and former CEO of the WEF alongside Schwab, José María Figueres, graduated from West Point 
(Rothkopf 198). Such training programs serve to promote U.S. views among future leaders, 
create a global network sympathetic to U.S. foreign policy, spread American military methods, 
and even support U.S. weapons sales (Rothkopf 198).  
 Traditional, big name universities also graduate or employ leaders in top foreign policy 
and national security positions, finance, and business, providing them with more elite 
connections (Rothkopf 149). An Ivy League name tag is one way of validating an individual’s 
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competence and ambition. It can also demonstrate legacy, a form of pedigree. Outside the U.S., 
Oxford, Cambridge, L’École Polytechnique, the Indian Institute of Technology, the University of 
Tokyo, and other prestigious names mark graduates for success and set them on a path of 
networking (Rothkopf 126). Using a sample size of 300 superclass members across sectors and 
countries, Rothkopf determines that attending an elite university is an important criterion for 
superclass membership (291). Rothkopf finds that almost 30% of his sample attended one of 
twenty elite universities, foremost Stanford, Harvard, and the University of Chicago (291). By 
and large, the superclass has much more education than the public, with more than five times the 
likelihood of a postgraduate degree compared to an average American (Rothkopf 291). In stark 
contrast to the nearly 50% of superclass members holding postgraduate degrees, only 0.06% of 
Ethiopians go to college (Rothkopf 309). Especially in the developing world, those who attend 
university tend not to be the poor. Educational inequalities are highly linked with class 
inequalities, an idea that ties into the discourse of Pierre Bordieu and Jean Claude Passeron who 
claim that a function of education is to “maintain class divisions through processes of 
socialization and selection” (qtd. in Keaton 96). 
 Even in the U.S., where universities claim to be “need blind” and education represents 
the grand social equalizer, the economic and social backgrounds of elite schools’ students are not 
representative of the country. In 2011, the Chronicle of Higher Education published data on the 
percentage of students receiving Pell Grants at the 50 wealthiest American institutions in 2008-9 
(Leonhardt). Part of the U.S.’s largest financial-aid program (which the U.S. House recently 
voted to cut by $5.7 billion) Pell Grant recipients come from the bottom half of the nation’s 
income distribution (Leonhardt). According to the Chronicle’s data, only 6.5% of Harvard 
students received the Pell Grant, which is to say, only 6.5% came from America’s bottom 
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economic half (Leonhardt). If Harvard were to reflect the same economic distribution as the U.S. 
in its student body, one would expect around half the students to be Pell Recipients. Harvard 
graduates go on to earn the fourth highest mid-career median salary of graduates from the 
nation’s top colleges, according to a 2010 report from PayScale (Toscano). A large public school, 
UCLA had the highest proportion of Pell Grant recipients, at 30.7% of the students (Leonhardt). 
Generally more diverse, economically and otherwise, public universities’ tuition is rising while 
funding is lower (Inside Job). Students from low-income families receive no additional 
consideration for admission for the same achievements as an economically privileged student, 
despite the obvious advantages.  
 While heralded as equal-opportunity, talent-seeking playing field levelers, universities 
are still businesses. They benefit from full tuition payments, and wealthy and prominent alumni. 
The academic system, which can be considered a transnational institution to some extent, also 
reflects state and corporate funding. There is a reason that General Motors has its name on 
multiple elite Business school auditoriums, and that academics tend to prove in their research 
what they are indirectly funded to discover. Leading professors in economics usually do not 
make most their money from teaching, but also work outside the school in finance and business 
positions. It comes as no surprise that they then tend to teach or publish papers on certain lines of 
thought that align with corporate and financial interests, without communicating their outside 
connections. Thus those fortunate enough to attend elite universities are often educated by 
individuals with potential conflicts of interest and narrowed perspectives. If the U.S., with the 
largest number of high-quality colleges, reveals an uneven distribution of higher education 
across economic classes, the students in Ethiopia are enormously disadvantaged by their 
geographical location. Rothkopf claims that the modern global elite are more mobile and open 
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than past elites, owing in part to the opening of established paths to the top such as education 
(309). But this opening is still a comparative one that is really just slightly ajar. 
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CHAPTER 3. Is Davos Woman Possible? 
“Davos Woman is worldly, wealthy and influential, too. But mostly, 
she is scarce.” 
         --Katrin Bennhold 
The previous chapters have provided an intersectional portrait of the new class of 
transnational elites. In light of the changing landscape of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
and analyses of the American power elite, the current global elite demonstrates a degree of 
variation from elites of the past. However, they still maintain many of the traits, behaviors, 
institutional hierarchies, power structures, and social features of the national elites of yesteryear. 
To a certain extent, mobility and diversity in the power elite have increased, but barriers to entry 
and homogeneity persevere. Zweigenhaft and Domhoff find the American power elite to be 
considerably diverse compared with its state in the 1950s, but still dominated by “white, 
Christian males, most of whom are still from the upper third of the social ladder” (7). In the 
international arena, typical minorities in America by race or religion have greater standing 
elsewhere, but the subjugation of women is more or less universal. Diversity in terms of 
sexuality for American and global power elites is essentially nonexistent. This chapter will focus 
on gender diversity in the global power elite, what it looks like, and what it means. The extension 
of Mills’ framework towards an analysis of women in the global power elite is still helpful for 
exacting trends and points of tension. 
 
Elite Women by the Numbers 
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Especially at the elite level it becomes clear: men have more power than women. 
Rothkopf places women at only 6.3% of the superclass, despite the fact that they represent 51% 
world’s inhabitants, a majority (290). Women became the majority of the American workforce in 
2010, making such discrepancies even more stark (Rosin). To say that women are 
underrepresented at the top levels is an understatement. The imbalance in the economic and 
professional realities between men and women is a global phenomenon, exacerbated where 
economic and professional clout is highest.  
 
Business:  
Women comprise less than three percent of hedge executives in the U.S. (Rushe). Falk’s 
global citizen as a “man of international affairs” shows similar numbers at the global level: 98% 
of those engaged in global capital and financial operations are men (43). Such numbers make the 
terms “man of international affairs” and “Davos man” empirically appropriate. Women fair the 
same in Fortune Global 500 companies, making up fewer than three percent of the CEOs 
(“Quota Imposed”). Women find less representation in major multinational corporations, whose 
positions tend to come with more prestige, but also pay less to women (Dresser). Fortune 500 
companies with more female board members report a 50% better return on equity than those with 
fewer or no women on their boards, but still jobs at the top of the pyramid remain elusive to 
women. The women who have marched up the ranks to lead a prominent company gain almost 
celebrity status, and tend to be paid higher for it, but they are rare exceptions. Women average 
fewer than ten percent of company board directors, and even then they are often merely tokens 
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(Bacani). Gender inequality in business at all levels reflects differences in salaries, participation 
levels, and access to high-skilled employment. 
 
Military: 
 When Mills wrote of “the men of violence: the United States warlords” there was no need 
to speak of women. Zweigenhaft and Domhoff describe a situation where women could only be 
promoted to general officer grade in the army and air force after 1967, and had to wait for 
legislation to pass navy and Marines promotions a decade later (70). America’s 1973 shift to an 
all-volunteer military, rather than using conscription, did lead to increased numbers of women on 
active duty, from 1.9% of the total force in 1972 to 15% in 2003 (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 70). 
Recent decades have witnessed a growing number of women in the U.S. military, including at 
the rank of general officer, but none at the very highest military ranks (Zweigenhaft and 
Domhoff 70). A recent and unprecedented move, American Air Force Major General Margaret 
Woodward ran the opening eleven days of the air war against Libya in March of 2011 (Stengel). 
While she marks progress, she claims that as a child adults told her women could not fly for the 
U.S. military (Stengel). Gender inequality is especially persistent in Mills’ circle of the military 
elite as high level promotions often depend on combat experience and other biases against 
women. The military represents such a male-dominated field that the addition of women has not 
ostensibly changed the culture, a point highlighted after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in which 
American female soldiers and generals were involved (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 71). 
Commentator Barbara Ehrenreich underlines the futility in assuming organizational changes as a 
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result of female leadership: “Women do not change institutions simply just by assimilating into 
them,” a point that rings true across sectors (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 72). 
 
Government:  
At the highest level of government, nineteen of the world’s presidents or prime ministers 
are currently women, a low number for female heads of state considering the world’s 195 
countries (“Quota Imposed”). Gaining more representation the lower down the professional 
ladder they go, women make up fifteen percent of the world’s ministers and parliamentarians 
(“Quota Imposed”). Stereotyped for their role in fostering community, women represent only 
eighteen percent of peace negotiators (Bacani). Overall, women lack representation in decision-
making structures and their political power suffers for it. However, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 
predict the political circle to be the main avenue of power where women will advance (80).  
 
 Women are entering the workforce at higher levels in each of these sectors, but they are 
stalling when it comes to achieving upper management positions and equal pay. On average, 
women earn 15.6% less than men (Bacani). The WEF’s Global Gender Gap Report from 2010 
rates 134 countries on their division of resources across genders. Gender inequality is measured 
in four areas: economic participation and opportunity, education attainment, health and survival, 
and political empowerment (Dresser). The Report shows that women and men’s health and 
education gaps are closing, closed 96% and 93%, respectively (Dresser). This indicates that the 
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other two indexes, political empowerment and economic participation and opportunity, as 
demonstrated in government and business, are lagging causes of inequality.  
Corporate structure, childcare infrastructure and long-held cultural stereotypes and 
gender roles contribute to the enduring gender disparity, but the structure of power also has a 
large role. The path to superclass membership is built on exclusivity, but it is even more closed 
off to women. At the elite level, the very institutions and hierarchies that serve to preserve 
traditional elite power, act against women who have essentially no independent place in the elite 
of the past. Atlantic Magazine’s “The End of Men” article tells of women overtaking men in the 
workforce, albeit generally at lower levels (Rosin). Judging from the current data, the end of men 
in the global power elite is nowhere in sight. Women clearly are continuing to enter the 
workforce and the ranks of entrepreneurs and professionals, but the rules of business show little 
corresponding change.  
 
Davos Gender Quota 
Zweigenhaft and Domhoff describe embarrassment from the lack of diversity as a 
motivating factor leading the internationally oriented American elites to accept a degree of 
diversity, as they compete internationally for loyalty (10). For the sake of appealing to investors 
and the public, retaining employees, and appearing socially progressive, many public and private 
entities have been spurred to promote their inclusion of women. Perhaps following suit, French 
President Sarkozy’s decision to appoint a half female cabinet shows a similar cognizance of 
image and the media in modern politics (Rothkopf 159). Initiatives to improve social image for 
practical reasons are nothing new for businesses, government entities, or the WEF. For the first 
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time, the WEF imposed a gender quota on its 100 Strategic Partners for its 2011 annual meeting 
(“Quota Imposed”). These top firms were required to include at least one female among their 
five delegates to the meeting in January, in hopes of raising the number of female participants up 
a few points to twenty percent (“Quota Imposed”). The quota has not increased overall female 
attendance (sixteen percent in 2011) because the quota applies only to the spaces reserved for the 
Strategic Partners, who more than doubled their numbers of women sent (Bennhold). The WEF 
spends a lot of time projecting concern for the gender gap, despite the fact that its own managing 
board is without a female presence, and that its twelve senior directors includes only two women 
(“Quota Imposed”). Of the 171 sessions at the 2011 WEF annual meeting, two focused on 
gender issues. Only a few additional sessions included gender in the debate. One of those two 
sessions, “How to Close the Gender Gap,” had an ironic key point: “Quotas only address 
symptoms and are being implemented as a last resort” (Rushe). 
Often hailed as affirmative action for women or state-sponsored feminism, quotas have 
been legally introduced in some countries. In 2006, Norway stipulated that the boards of publicly 
traded companies must be at least forty percent women (Traufetter). With Nordic countries 
filling the top four WEF Global Gender Gap 2010 rankings and with Norway placed in second, 
the country has been lauded for leading the way in action against gender inequality (Dresser). 
German columnist Gerald Traufetter points out that while the quota led the number of female 
board members of publicly traded companies to increase over twenty percent in just two years, it 
yielded no change in the composition of CEOs for those companies in the same years. Traufetter 
also noted that Norway is still not unlike other countries in that the majority of women still work 
in the public sector, as teachers, nurses or kindergarten teachers, and that the corporate glass 
ceiling still exists. Facing the arguments of a “female management style” seen in WEF articles, 
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feminist literature, and the media, corporate CEO surveys reveal that women’s effect on the 
working style on boards has been minimal (Traufetter). Whether this is attributable to the nature 
of the position or attempts to fit into the male mold, it is difficult to tell. As the ratio of their paid 
labor time to domestic work increases, perhaps women are increasingly adopting the masculine 
norms and traits of the “economic man” (Benería 73). 
The criticism surrounding quotas for corporate boards or WEF delegates is generally that 
such practices merely reflect perfunctory or symbolic gestures as an act of tokenism rather than 
an act addressing the causes. The WEF sessions surrounding gender issues themselves seem 
token. The conversation occurring in the few gender-themed sessions is not present in the rest of 
the discussions at the WEF. If “gender” or “women” are not in the session title, the topics are 
absent from the discussion. The domestic and global policy priorities for the U.S. in 2011 
covered in “The Priorities for the U.S. Economy” certainly do not broach the gender gap. Many 
of the WEF sessions feature topics of current media interest (e.g. Haiti), but while they perhaps 
generate awareness, they are not the discussions at the crux of the summit with lasting attention. 
Still, the Davos discussions presented by the WEF surrounding the gender gap provide room for 
analysis. 
A WEF session discussing action towards gender parity in the workplace, “The Gender 
Agenda: Putting Parity into Practice” promotes the idea of executives harnessing technology to 
“create more flexible working environments” that encourage a greater work-life balance as a 
solution to the upper level gender imbalance. The claim is also made that as the Western 
corporate cultures evolves, “the rest of the world… will have to reform as well” (“The Gender 
Agenda”). The overwhelmingly Eurocentric panel relies on corporate leadership to effect 
changes that, while promoting employee work-life balance, do no help their bottom line. 
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Promoting a work-life balance for employees may improve their happiness, but it stands in 
opposition to the standard of long hours and competition at major corporations, which in obvious 
ways benefits the business and its executives. Reliance on an elite corporate figure to go against 
his or her own economic incentives to create social benefits for employees is not a productive or 
viable discourse. Superclass members did not achieve their status by doing favors without returns, 
which the session fails to convincingly identify. Arguments of corporate image, 
recruitment/retention, etc. might have more bearing than platitudes such as “gender parity is 
good business” and “women comprise one-half of human capital” (“The Gender Agenda”). 
Additionally, expectations of foreign corporate leaders, likely competitors, are unfounded and 
unrealistic. Imposed national regulations through vague “progressive policy” hazard the 
possibility of losing the corporation’s national allegiance to countries where labor will opt out of 
a flexible work-life balance for the sake of gender parity.  
 A second key point presented in “The Gender Agenda” session to encourage gender 
parity frames equality as strategic: “When at least one-half of all customers are women, 
corporate leadership that reflects the composition of the general public will have an easier time 
connecting with their clients.” An argument of more diverse perspectives for better strategic 
decision-making is logical, but unlikely to reach the level of global elites, who arrived there 
through their homogeneity and identity politics in many senses. Corporate leadership’s main 
concern is not to individually connect with the general public on a personal level. They would 
not be in the position they are if they simply wanted to reflect the composition of the general 
public. Such a line of reasoning would call for corporate leadership to have less education and be 
significantly younger. Expecting executives to take measures to avoid “in-group thinking” and 
promote the questioning of conventional wisdom is contrary to the system in which the 
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superclass arose. The actions called upon in the WEF session do not correspond to the elite’s 
modus operandi or the theory of uncertainty that underlies common traits and conformity among 
leadership positions. 
 This session reflects the kind of discourse on upper level gender parity imparted at Davos, 
where wives and dates of the attendees are most of the women there. As unproductive as it may 
be, such a session had to happen, as a token of the WEF’s social progressiveness and relevance. 
Tokenism, according to Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, does have benefits for organizations as it 
restores public confidence in the system and its fairness (7). Companies (and the WEF) may 
benefit from appearing diverse (in members and topics). Zweigenhaft and Domhoff argue that 
women in higher management and on boards provide “a valuable buffer between the men who 
control the corporation and the corporation’s labor force (and the general public)” (58). Women 
can serve as liaisons with their group, women, and other marginalized agents and institutions. An 
incentive for corporations to include women in higher management and on their boards is the 
legitimating function their presence there serves (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 7). While this may 
facilitate the inclusion of women into management, they tend to be channeled away from 
positions in top management and into “soft” areas including labor relations and public relations 
(Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 58). This role of women as tokens, ambassadors, and buffers has 
often benefited the elite more than women (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 245). 
 
Cultural Overcompensation 
 A WEF survey last year found that employees around the globe considered “patriarchal 
corporate culture” to be the biggest barrier to female leadership (Rushe). In the male-centered 
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cultures of the military, business, and politics, women have to be more exemplary of the culture 
so as to blend in and ease the “uncertainty”, which undermines the idea of diversity. One Davos 
panel, “Women with a Business Impact,” boldly asserts that “women have to outperform men to 
be successful; they must over-achieve to succeed.” A female gender is essentially a superclass 
handicap. A woman must overcome this difference from the elite norm by exhibiting other 
aspects of her background, practices, and perspectives that align with the elite. The drive towards 
assimilation and conformity in the global power elite leads women to prove their elitism through 
membership in the upper economic and social classes, family connections, volunteerism, 
academics, networking, and other social mechanisms. According to Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 
“The newcomers to the power elite have found ways to signal that they are willing to join the 
game as it has always been played, assuring the old guard that they will call for not more than 
relatively minor adjustments” (7). Thus the new element in the elite class of gender is still 
transcended by conventional shared values and interests, and an appropriate level of assimilation 
to male culture.  
 
Education:  
 In line with the need for compensation for having a female sex in traditionally and 
culturally male-run institutions, higher education is a common way to gain advantage. Higher 
education for women and their academic success has boomed in recent decades to the point 
where women now graduate from college in far higher numbers than men in the U.S. Women are 
thriving at the secondary level too, with 72% of all high school valedictorians in 2009 belonging 
to fairer sex. In “The End of Men,” Hanna Rosin describes a situation where elite American 
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colleges have a level of affirmative action for men in their efforts to maintain a gender equal 
student body. Rosin cites a 2003 study of selective liberal arts schools by economist Sandy Baum 
and Eban Goodstein, whose findings show that a male gender raises college acceptance rates 6.5 
to 9 percentage points. Women are clearly capitalizing on the relative accessibility of education. 
Many cite higher education as a way for women to close the gender gap. In gender progressive 
Finland, women have a higher enrollment rate in secondary and tertiary education than men, but 
they still earn eighteen percent less on average (Rushe). Three separate studies presented by 
Zweigenhaft and Domhoff concluded that women on American corporate boards were better 
educated than their male counterparts (52). 
 Not only the degree, but the educational institution matter. The top tier schools for law, 
business, public policy, and international relations attended by men in the elite class also filter 
many of the women joining them (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 7). While elite business graduate 
schools tend to graduate a far higher number of men, they provide the same opportunity of 
institutionalized relationships and networks for women. However, while the doors seem open, 
social processes are still occurring that channel women away from elite educational paths, often 
through self-selection. One only needs to consider at the numbers of men with Art History, 
Education, or French majors, and the percentage of women with degrees in Computer Science, 
Economics, or Political Science to see that gender segregation exists in academia. Differences in 
degree specialization for men feed into professions that are traditionally reserved for men, such 
as politics and science. 
 
Cultural Legacy of Stereotypes and Traditional Roles 
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Gender stereotypes and cultural bases attributing strengths, weakness, goals, and qualities 
to the sexes continue to persist. Many of the arguments for gender parity hinge on assumed 
gender traits. While much of behavior and personality are innate, even more is believed to be 
formed by one’s circumstances and ambient environment through operant conditioning and other 
stimuli. As the cultural landscape changes for both sexes in terms of societal roles and 
professionalism, cultural norms regarding male and female characteristics so too evolve. As 
gender identities are slowly reconstituted, “women’s ways of seeing and doing” become variable 
(Benería 73). From women’s increasing level of engagement in the capitalist and professional 
markets, Benería derives the question, “Are women becoming more individualistic, selfish and 
less nurturing?” (73). The French Minister of Finance, Christine Lagarde, maintains that rich and 
successful women, especially mothers, stay more connected to the real world because they still 
must juggle work and home life to a larger extent (Bennhold). More often than upper-level 
professional men, upper-level professional women tend to bear the greater responsibility for 
children, grocery shopping, and interactions with nannies, teachers, parents, and housekeepers, 
keeping them in touch with society and farther from entitlement (Bennhold). 
Rothkopf lists the psychological traits characteristic of the global power elite. Whether 
these are traits suited to the nature of their positions (and paths to them), or predominantly male 
traits is unclear. This becomes a question of nature versus nurture and attribution. The fact that 
people with power tend to take risks and come to depend on the endorphins associated with their 
high-stakes positions may not be dependent on gender (Rothkopf 294). Women in similar 
positions may also come to exhibit riskier behavior. A similar line of thinking is demonstrated in 
a study finding increasing numbers of women displaying extreme or violent aggression in the 
workplace, which suggests that the position affects individual behavior for women and men 
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(Rosin). Thus, when a Davos session produces an assessment such as this: “women in leadership 
positions help mitigate risk (women tend to be more risk averse) and serve as an important 
counterbalance in the world and workplace,” its certainty should be questioned (“Women with a 
Business Impact”). Changes based on such statements can create unfair expectations for 
women’s roles and performance. The confidence to approach risk and make high-stakes 
decisions in uncharted territory is a key aspect of leadership. 
Another common selling point for corporate women is the assumption that women will 
offer a compassionate value system, one even used by Schwab, who proclaimed an imperative 
for “a true gender equality revolution” (Dresser). In light of the current recession, qualities such 
as women’s lack of “group think” and their mental diversity are emphasized. A panel on “How 
to Close the Gender Gap” underscores women’s ability to complement the management of men: 
“There is a history of women being whistle-blowers and being less inclined to coercive group 
thinking, also known as “group think.”  Women have also been sold as being more self-critical, a 
trait supposedly suggesting resistance to the “theatre of leadership involved in running a 
company or government” (“The Gender Agenda”). Research proving women to be less inclined 
to corruption and these other points seem like short term benefits simply listed to start the ball 
rolling on gender parity. Such research reflects women in a specific corporate setting and social 
zeitgeist, rather than evolving ones. 
The current zeitgeist is definitely a male-oriented one, which seems to not only hold back 
women, but leads them to hold themselves back. One statistic reported at the WEF session “The 
Gender Agenda,” revealed that “49% of men said they would start a company, versus only 29% 
of women,” according to a Facebook poll. Similarly, in an online undergraduate student survey 
conducted by Dartmouth Alumni Magazine, twelve percent less women than men considered 
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themselves in the intellectual “top tier” compared to their fellow students (“The Millennial 
Mindset” 26). Confidence, one of the key ingredients to professional success, seems 
comparatively lacking for the female half. Longtime Davos attendee and French finance minister, 
Christine Lagarde, also admits to faltering confidence in the midst of “male-dominated chemistry” 
at venues like the WEF meeting: “You know you’re competent, you’ve looked at your files, but 
somehow you feel inhibited” (Bennhold). Woman also must balance the task of appearing a 
certain level of competitive and tough, but also maintaining a careful amount of femininity, 
attractiveness, and care (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff). 
Personal conversations at a Trinity College Alumnae Networking event for women 
confirmed the masculine culture of professional institutions as several woman voiced difficulty 
in managing traditional female and household roles with moving up the professional ladder. Two 
female CEOs admitted to making many family sacrifices in order to further their careers. While 
this may be typical of either gender, it is a decision that is highly stigmatized for women. One 
CEO professed the importance of adapting to the male social scene, or at least showing up even 
if the only woman present. When the culture at the top corporate and financial positions is 
known to include strip clubs, cocaine, and prostitution all covered by the corporate black card, it 
becomes even harder to tread the gender tightrope (Inside Job). The elite institutions are no 
longer exclusively male enclaves as Mills saw, but they’re not wide open for women either. The 
imbalances in the global power structure result in a protracted movement towards change. 
 
 
 
68 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite proclaims of increased diversity, innovation, meritocracy, inclusivity, and 
freedom, a small group of individuals continue to guard a monopoly on capital, ideas, and power. 
The neoliberal key words of entrepreneurship and innovation have been advanced in the 
neoliberal era, however their application is often to serve a less inspiring ends. These words are 
applied less to the people and more to a global thinking of power relations and a capitalist 
agenda. Operating in both national and transnational realms and capitalizing on the international 
voids between national nodes, the global power elite walk the line of denationalization and 
national structures of power, wherever it best benefits them. They hail from across the globe, but 
are still weighted towards a Western geographical background. Trends in the demographic and 
geographic shifts of the elite foretell power changes in the international playing field. American 
hegemony is still reflected in both the global environment and the elite class, but other actors are 
gaining authority and coming into play. 
 These actors may include rising countries such as China, the emergence of the shadow 
elite who “don’t need to go to Davos,” and anti-Davos elites such as Iran’s Ahmadinejad or 
Venezuela’s Chavez and his “Bolivarian Consensus” (Rothkopf 187). Rothkopf cites the 
emerging world, especially Asia, to hold the fastest-growing groups (291). Predictions of a 
superpower rivalry between the U.S. and China suggest a future G2 arrangement of power, while 
others still predict a G-Zero rearrangement for geopolitical equilibrium (Dowell 48). Established 
and emerging nuclear powers, France, the U.K. and Russia in the former category, and India, 
Pakistan, Israel, and Iran in the latter, also wield (or soon will) the power of force, projecting 
significant roles for their elites (Dowell 48). While coordination is usually fragmented and ad 
hoc, strengthened alliances between states with supranational law also affect the balance of 
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power, setting up leaders of E.U. for influential positions. The reality of global interdependency 
and gaps illuminate the absence of a centralized agency or authority and power of those of 
attempting to fill it (Dowell 54). The antiglobalist response and growing list of successful 
grassroots movements, often fueled by commonplace technologies, also present potential for 
viable opposition and change.  
Members of the global power elite are in many ways removed from the lifestyles, 
ideologies, and realities of the general population, yet they are the ones shaping its world. When 
only one of every seventeen superclass members is female, the stagnation towards gender parity 
at all classes is not surprising. It is also not surprising that as their consolidation in power and 
international influence increases, the terms of trade and economics have increasingly profited 
them. The members of the elite change, but the culture largely remains the same. Despite our 
love for rags-to-riches stories, they are not as common as the media portrays, and high social 
origins are the most important factor in making elites present and past (Zweigenhaft and 
Domhoff 7). 
The WEF report on its 2011 annual meeting paints an uncertain portrait of the realities of 
the modern world: 
Globalization, shifting demographics, rapidly accelerating technological change, 
increased connectivity, economic uncertainty, a growing multiplicity of actors and 
shifting power structures combine to make operating in this world unprecedentedly 
complex and challenging for corporations, institutions and countries alike (Dowell 27). 
Despite all the shifts, accelerations, changes, risks, and complexities of the global condition, one 
thing that is sure to remain is the presence of a global power elite. Denationalized as they are, 
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their pledge of allegiance might be: To the re-private, for which it expands, 195 nations under a 
nondenominational being, indivisible markets, with trade liberty and just his for all (or at least 
one in a million). 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure 3. CEOs of 22 Largest Companies by Nationality 
 
Collected from Fortune’s 2010 rankings of the World’s Largest Companies (“Global 500”). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
World’s 22 Largest Companies 2010 and Their CEOs’ Nationalities: 
1. Wal-mart*  
2. Dutch Royal Shell (Swiss)  
3. Exxon Mobil*  
4. BP (British)  
5. Toyota Motor (Japanese)  
6. Japan Post Holdings (Japanese)  
7. Sinopec (Chinese)  
8. State Grid (Chinese)  
9. AXA (French) 
10. China National Petroleum (Chinese) 
11. Chevron* 
12. ING Group (Netherlands) 
13. General Electric* 
14. Total (French) 
15. Bank of America*  
16. Volkswagen (German)  
17. ConocoPhillips*  
18. BNP Paribas (French) 
19. Assicurazioni Generali (Italian) 
20. Allianz (German) 
21. AT&T* 
22. Carrefour (Swedish) 
* Indicates American CEO 
Collected from Fortune’s 2010 rankings of the World’s Largest Companies (“Global 500”). 
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